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Sarikyan, Aren: The United Nations and Conflict Prevention in the Post-Cold War Era -
Constraints to Effective Policy Making and Implementation
Druck Diplomica GmbH, Hamburg, 2006
Zugl.: Universität Wien, Magisterarbeit, 2005
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The United Nations and Conflict Prevention
in the post-Cold War Era
Constraints to Effective Policy Making and Implementation
DIPLOMARBEIT
zur Erlangung des Magistergrades der Philosophie
an der Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät der
Universität Wien
eingereicht von
AREN SARIKYAN
Wien 2005
2
Contents
1.
Introduction ... 5
2.
Research Question and Operationalization ... 7
I.
Theoretical Approaches ...
13
1.
Applying Relevant International Relations Theories ... 13
2.
Realism ... 17
2.1. Major Actors and Assumptions ... 18
2.2. Power, Security, Stability ... 21
2.3. Neorealism ... 28
2.4. System and Change ... 31
3.
Pluralism ... 33
3.1. Major Actors and Assumptions ... 34
3.2. Transnationalism, Interdependence, Multilateralism ... 37
3.3.
Institutional Theory ... 45
3.4.
System and Change ... 51
4.
Policy-Relevant Theories ... 53
4.1. Foreign Policy Making ... 58
4.2. Crisis Decision-Making ... 61
4.3. Rational and Cognitive Approaches ... 63
5.
Summary and Evaluation ... 65
II. Conflict Prevention ... 68
1. Conflict ... 68
1.1. Causes and Trends ... 69
1.2. Interstate Conflicts ... 72
1.3. Intrastate Conflicts ... 75
2. On Conflict Prevention ... 79
2.1. Operational Prevention ... 82
2.2. Structural Prevention ... 86
2.3. The "Preventive War" Dilemma ... 89
3
3. Conflict Prevention as UN Policy ... 93
3.1. Charter Provisions and Resolutions ... 94
3.2. Policy Formation and Change ... 96
3.3. Policy Improvement ... 99
4.
Summary and Evaluation ... 100
III. Policy Making and Implementation ... 103
1. Framework of Analysis ... 103
2. Actors of Conflict Prevention ... 103
2.1. The Security Council ... 103
2.2. The General Assembly ... 108
2.3. The Secretariat ... 111
2.4. The Economic and Social Council ... 114
2.5. The UN System ... 116
3. Tools of Conflict Prevention ... 118
3.1. Preventive Diplomacy ... 118
3.2. Disarmament ... 121
3.3. Peacekeeping ... 124
3.4. Peacebuilding ... 128
3.5. Sanctions ... 130
3.6. Use of Force ... 134
4.
Summary and Evaluation ... 137
IV. Case Studies ... 140
1.
Survey Methods ... 140
2.
Rwanda ... 141
2.1.
Crisis ... 142
2.2.
UN Response ... 144
2.3.
Constraints and Challenges ... 149
3.
Iraq ... 152
3.1.
Crisis ... 153
3.2.
UN Response ... 156
3.3.
Constraints and Challenges
... 162
4. Summary and Evaluation ... 164
4
V. Constraints to Effective Conflict Prevention ... 165
1.
Political ... 166
2.
Legal ... 167
3.
Operational ... 168
4.
Institutional ... 169
Conclusion ... 170
Annex 1: Rwanda Map ... 172
Annex 2: Iraq Map ... 173
Bibliography ... 174
5
1. Introduction
Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, world affairs have entered into a new
era of hopes, opportunities, threats and challenges significantly reframing the international
relations of the late twentieth century and beyond. It was a momentum that states,
governments, and organizations worldwide embraced with expectations and visions of
change. So did the United Nations (UN). The new era was particularly promising for this
universal organization as it had presumably overcome the paralyzed nature of its
functioning throughout the Cold War. Moreover, the UN was deemed to have acquired the
freedom and authority it needs to exercise its primary obligation enshrined in the Charter,
i.e. to prevent and remove through collective efforts "threats to the peace", to suppress acts
of aggression and to resolve international disputes through peaceful means and "in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law."
1
The first sentence in the
preamble of the Charter, while claiming the international community's determination "to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war," illustrates the high cause attached to
the birth of the organization with a clear link to preventing armed conflicts.
The basic idea of preventing armed conflicts is not novel, and the term preventive
diplomacy was coined by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld already in 1960.
2
Initially
the term was understood in the context of the Cold War, when UN efforts were undertaken
to eliminate localized disputes and wars that could have provoked wider confrontations
between the two superpowers. Notwithstanding its conceptual importance and available
operational tools (peacekeeping, sanctions, use of force), conflict prevention received little
attention at the margins of global power politics. Traditional diplomatic instruments
(mediation, conciliation, good offices) defined the toolbox of conflict prevention activities.
Preventive diplomacy, however, received particular attention because of the way
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali broadened and publicized it in his by now well-known
report Agenda for Peace.
3
The need for credible early warning mechanisms and fact-
finding missions was equally prioritized.
1
See Charter of the United Nations, Article 1 (1).
2
LUND, Michael S., Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, United States
Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 1996, p. 32.
3
For the entire report, see Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and
peacekeeping", UN Documents: A/47/277 - S/24111.
6
Since the end of the Cold War, the necessity to move from a culture of reaction to a
culture of prevention has incessantly been emphasized and gradually reinforced into
unequivocal policy through numerous General Assembly resolutions, Security Council
(hereon also the Council) resolutions and presidential statements, as well as through
various reports and speeches by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In addition, the
growing number of armed conflicts in the beginning of the 1990s, albeit most of them of
civil war nature, has in turn incurred considerable pressure on the international community
to reduce human suffering and destruction in many parts of the globe. Thus, the dire need
to tackle conflict prevention policy into concrete actions can also be attributed to rapid
proliferation of violent conflicts, often generating unprecedented destruction and rather
grave human rights violations.
The failure of the United Nations, as the embodiment of the international community, to
prevent large-scale atrocities such as in Rwanda and the Balkans clearly point to deficient
implementation of the organization's pursued goals. Systematic failures to prevent conflicts
have resulted in abundant scholarly literature attempting to explain their complex causes,
as well as the role and functions of relevant institutions tasked with their containment, de-
escalation, and resolution.
This work attempts to identify and analyze constraints to effective conflict prevention
policies pursued and practiced at the UN level. The term policy - understood as a notion
including both decisions and actions,
4
taken under the loop later in this work - may be
useful in providing a core concept, while enabling other variables such as actors engaged
in decision-making processes and various tools employed to carry out these decisions to be
operationalized. Given the multiplicity of actors and complex processes conjoining both
ends of policy making and implementation, thus creating a common domain for the
observed phenomenon, the notion of policy will serve as a point of analytical departure and
will streamline the scope of its explanatory claims. Attempts to define or draw a borderline
between its two constituencies, i.e. between policy making and implementation, is not
whatsoever the purpose of this work.
7
A meticulous analysis of the factors conditioning cognitive behavior of actors within a
larger decision-making process (policy making), as well as specific actions stemming from
such processes and interactions (policy implementation), requires dismantling the umbrella
concept policy into two subordinate ones and testing, in light of relevant theories and
empirical evidence, working hypotheses pertinent to these subconcepts.
Two megatheories of international relations encompassing a number of other significant
theories, namely realism and pluralism, will provide the analytical vertebrae of this work.
Policy-relevant theories will supplement to the analysis of decision-making and
bureaucratic processes both on domestic and international levels and will further provide
hindsight through rational and cognitive choice theories.
2. Research Question and Operationalization
As already mentioned above, the purpose of this work is to identify and analyze constraints
to effective UN policy making and implementation to prevent armed conflicts.
The objectives of the analysis stem from a supposition that, despite the widely favored and
accepted form by the United Nations to secure peace and stability worldwide through
conflict prevention, it has not succeeded to forestall armed conflicts and impede large-scale
human suffering in several post-Cold War crisis situations it has intervened. Inferring from
this supposition, the following hypothetical statement can be outlined: there are
constraints to UN decision-making and implementation processes that condition the
degree of effectiveness in preventing violent armed conflicts. Two clarifications should be
provided here.
Constraints, in this work, are conceived to be factors hindering either effective
decision-making of the organization or the successful implementation of its
proclaimed goals and/or missions with tools available for conflict prevention.
5
4
VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and
Beyond, (rev. ed.), Allyn and Bacon, Boston, London, 1999, p. 210.
5
Since policy prescribes a course of action to achieve anticipated outcome, it is important to note that
examining formal prescriptions and comparing them with decisions and actions undertaken in certain
situations will serve to illustrate the extent of their compatibility. Acute incompatibility supported by
empirical analysis is suggestive of deviating factors; hence identifying the underlying causes of such
deviations will help us track constraints affecting decision-making processes.
8
Effectiveness can be assessed through juxtaposing the outcome produced as a result of
UN intervention in a particular crisis with the decisions and actions taken to prevent its
escalation into an armed confrontation.
6
Effectiveness is used with several functions in this work. On the one hand, it helps us
assess the outcome of preventive missions without running to the extremes and defining
policies as merely successful or failed, i.e. it provides us with a certain degree of elasticity
and flexibility to evaluate these missions by contrasting their consequences with pursued or
proclaimed objectives, and to see whether the effects are positive or negative.
7
This can be
achieved through evaluation of the impact exerted on human and material loss, as well as
through their contribution to averting violence. On the other hand, however linked to the
former function, it helps us build working hypotheses that can be tested against empirical
data in case studies (Part IV).
Furthermore, what one might spontaneously feel to be confronted with at the initial stage
of analysis is the multiplicity and complexity of connotations the term policy entails. Since
conflict prevention policies, seen through both decisions and actions, may roughly be
divided into two domains of investigation yet not separated as direct interaction between
the two exists, and where pertaining to those concepts variables such as decision-makers
and instruments tend to maintain a causal relationship, it would be reasonable, perhaps in
practical terms, to investigate both domains separately, while taking into consideration
how decisions impact the choices of actions, and how the former can be influenced by the
consequences of these actions.
8
Such an approach enables us to establish a cyclical causal
relationship, i.e. from policy making to implementation, and then proceeding back to
6
Intervening variables, in terms of non-UN actors or developments exogenous to UN efforts, will not be
considered as independent variables out of the UN's sphere of influence. Since the thesis involves prevention
efforts nominally ascribed to the organization, it also follows the logic that effective [UN] policies presume
possible or conceivable developments, which may potentially intervene with the spectrum of preventive
actions undertaken by the UN.
7
Negative effects are understood as no changes produced by the UN on a crisis situation, or results generated
by actions that have exacerbated the situation and which could have been spared had the UN not intervened.
8
Decisions can be influenced by certain outcomes of actions, i.e. polices may be reconsidered and changed if
actions initiated to produce intended results will, under some circumstances, result in undesired or
unexpected consequences. In literature, what has often served as grounds for the reconsideration of UN
policies appears in terms of 'learned lessons', i.e. experiences gained from previous missions and applied to
designing and implementing new ones.
9
policy making in form of policy feedback. Viewing this kind of interaction as cyclical also
implies that policy making is a continual process where each notion in the cycle is both a
dependent and an independent variable at distinct stages and in specified relations - a
model that renders segmented operationalization possible. Nevertheless, amidst such
complexity, patterned analysis is deemed to be useful for some reasons:
[S]tage-oriented discussions do not form the direct basis for hypothesizing causal
relationships, although such hypothesis may emerge. Rather, they are rough chronological
and logical guides for observers who want to see important activities in some ordered
pattern or sequence. Such organizational helpers are useful and, in fact, essential for
anyone trying to plow through the complexities of policy making and policy analysis.
9
As illustrated on Figure 1, the inferred causal relationships between policy making (PM),
policy implementation (PI) and policy feedback (PF) are presented on two lines, internal
and external, which are both cyclical and sequential. The internal layer presents a rather
simplistic presentation of causality, whereas the external one expands policy into its
conceptual and abstract realm, while providing more analytical vacuum without imperiling
the model with its intermediate notions.
Actions
De cisions
Outcome
Actors
Crisis
Tools
PM
PI
PF
Figure 1. Cyclical Causality in Conflict Prevention Policy
9
RIPLEY, Randall B., Policy Analysis in Political Science, Wadsworth, 1985, p. 48.
10
Although such a schematic presentation may produce a number of questions as to the
ingredients of each constituent, their given positions and interactions, it is beneficial to
create an order where overlapping concepts can be discerned and analyzed while avoiding
overall confusion. As James Rosenau asserts in one of his nine principals for creative
theorizing, assuming that there must be an underlying order allows us to approach the
chaos we perceive in the world around us as a challenge, as an orderliness that has yet to
be identified and traced. It permits us to think theory thoroughly because the affairs of
people are patterned and the patterns are susceptible to being uncovered.
10
Decisions made in the Security Council - the UN authoritative body whose resolutions are
legitimately binding for all member states - are extending into foreign policy making of
individual states, which in turn may be influenced by both state and non-state actors. Thus,
taking into account only the mechanisms and tools available to the UN will not be
sufficient to understand the conflict prevention agenda of the organization. Prudent
examination of major interest groups involved in the process of making up such policies
(before they land in the UN and speak in one common voice on behalf of a state) is
indispensable for understanding the stakes attached to particular situations. Moreover, the
choices of the tools to regulate crisis situations may differ from member state to member
state based on preferences, which may result not only in belated action to preclude threats
but also in considerable inaction. For that purpose, major assumptions of realist, pluralist
as well as policy-relevant theories will be applied to provide extensive theoretical
groundwork for deeper analysis of foreign policymaking procedures at the domestic level
and their transmittance or transformation in the international system.
Critique has always been a welcome device in social sciences. It has constantly served as a
vehicle for humans' cognitive and perceptual digestion of the surrounding environment and
remains a constant source of progressive thinking. As a result of incessant mutual critique
between major paradigms in international relations theory - most notably between realism
and pluralism - numerous anomalies adherent to this or that megatheory have been
identified, while adjusting, readjusting, cultivating and, at times, complementing
10
ROSENAU, James N., The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, Nichols, 1980 (rev. ed.), pp. 19-31.
11
controversial assumptions for a more accurate picture of world affairs. As Robert Keohane
notes, prudent conceptualization of social action as part of international relations theory
requires consideration of both opposed camps:
Constructivists and liberals emphasizing domestic politics seek to explicate variations in
preferences, available strategies, and the nature of the players, across space and time,
while rationalists try to explain strategies, given preferences, information, and common
knowledge. Neither project can be complete without the other.
11
Guided by this spirit, part one presents the above-mentioned two dominant paradigms in
international relations theory along with their critical observations on peace, security and
cooperation. Essential to this work concepts such as state and non-state actors in
international relations, understanding the international system as such, the role of
institutions in world politics, emerging transnationalism and interdependence as factors in
stability and vulnerability are discussed here. In addition, policy-relevant theories will
attempt to uncover some relevant bargaining and negotiating processes between competing
interest groups, and will further elucidate relevant bureaucratic and organizational
structures streamlining or constraining such processes. The purpose is to create an
extensive theoretical basis that can be utilized to critical and prudent analysis of the
surveyed phenomenon.
Part two, which is both descriptive and analytical, provides approaches to understanding
conflicts along with their trends and possible causes. It takes into account the altered nature
of the international system of the post-Cold War environment and reveals the complexity
of intrastate conflicts - a prevailing dilemma for the UN in regard to intervention and
sovereignty. How the United Nations perceives conflicts and what measures it employs to
forestall them, whether operational prevention (measures applicable in the face of
immediate crisis) or structural prevention (measures to ensure that crisis do not arise in the
11
KEOHANE, Robert and MARTIN, Lisa, Institutional Theory as a Research Program in ELMAN, Colin
FENDIUS ELMAN, Miriam (eds.), Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field,
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 2003, pp. 96-97. Comp. also Andrew Moravcsik who, while
contending the liberal research program, claims that international relations theory without realism or
institutionalism strikes (...) as absurd on its face, ibid., p. 199.
12
first place or, if they do, that they do not recur),
12
are further discussed here. To what
extent conflict prevention policy has been substantiated in UN legal and institutional
realms - how far it has moved from rhetoric to practice - is equally reflected in this chapter.
In part three, the two domains supporting the umbrella concept for conflict prevention
policy are further dismantled and analyzed in terms of their constituents. The first part
deals with major actors preoccupied with decision-making processes, where who and why
questions attempt to reveal actors and their motivations, interests, rights and obligations
attached to particular situations. The second part tackles instruments at the UN's disposal
while considering what and how questions as to the choice of the tools and their
application in the implementation of prevention policies. Both actors and tools of conflict
prevention are examined, while applying relevant theories, through reversed disposition of
constituents in each stage of the cycle (dependent variables) against their preceding ones
(independent variables), i.e. through analytical juxtaposition of effects and causes (see
Figure 1). Assumptions made on possible challenges constraining the roles and functions
of both actors and tools of conflict prevention will provide the working hypothesis to be
tested in case studies.
Part four, the core empirical part of this work, analyzes two cases of attempted UN conflict
prevention with different outcomes and attempts to identify constraints to decision-making
and policy implementation processes in various crisis situations. Two case studies -
Rwanda and Iraq - are subjected to comparative analysis with relevant working hypotheses
tested against available empirical data. Selection of these particular cases has been made
considering such criteria as nature of conflict, geopolitical environment, diversity of actors
and interests involved, as well as choices of preventive instruments. The cases are
examined with particular emphasis on factors impeding or conducing to the success of
missions launched under the aegis of the UN. The distinct nature of these cases accounts
for recurrent or identical structural and functional patterns supporting or rebutting
assumptions and findings in Part III.
12
See Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict, Carnegie
Corporation of New York, December 1997, p. 37.
13
Concluding, part five collects the factors constraining effective policy making and
implementation processes identified in part four and attempts to classify them under major
conceptual domains: political, legal, operational and institutional. The intention in this
chapter is to present the nature of these constraints and illustrate their complexity and
specificity as they occur in given stages of policy making and implementation.
I. Theoretical Approaches
1.
Applying Relevant International Relations Theory
Notwithstanding the growing number and perplexity of items taking over the agenda of
world politics, the war and peace dichotomy maintains its significance in major paradigms
of international relations theory. Whether realism, pluralism, globalism, institutionalism -
all of them yield considerable attention to theories attempting to explain or predict trends
and causes of conflicts. Indeed, conflicts pose a substantial puzzle to international relations
theorists who use numerous methodological approaches to developing better causal
theory.
13
Observing that the phenomenon still persists, in spite of being extremely costly in
terms of human loss and overall damage, many scholars have found immense interest in
examining the underlying causes of wars. Furthermore, as conflict prevention has become
the ideological mantra of many international organizations, NGOs, governments and other
entities, theories contending various mechanisms and techniques as part of conflict
management have proven to be quite appealing for many academic circles.
However, amid growing number of international relations theories, one may pose a
question as to which theories can be utilized in most favorable ways to shed reasonable
explanation on the phenomenon under investigation. Limiting oneself with just one
paradigm and taking into consideration narrowly related assumptions may not be adequate
for thorough understanding of intricate problems since each of them offers different
perspectives on items under investigation, different approaches to analysis, and different
points of departure with varying emphasis on particular issues. Given such a plethora of
theories, it may also be inconvenient to streamline the research process. Thus, applying
theories dealing with immediate core concepts comprising the phenomenon and keeping
13
VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V, op. cit., 1999, p. 4.
14
auxiliary theories on the sidelines is one way to provide theoretical framework for an
initiated survey.
Following this line of argumentation and taking into account the evolution of two major
paradigms in international relations theory, namely realism and pluralism,
14
with notable
devotion to understanding war, peace, cooperation as well as their approaches to uncover
underlying causes of conflicts, efforts will be geared to present the fundamental premises
guiding each paradigm, along with relevant theories illuminating other concepts
incorporated in this work. The relevance of these megatheories is particularly evident
when, for example, one analyzes decision-making processes as part of foreign policy
making within states through the lenses of pluralist theories, or when Security Council
members bargain or negotiate over resolutions while acting on behalf of states they
represent, i.e. when states - observed through the realist prism - are rational and unified
actors in the international system. Moreover, a rather contradictory theorizing between the
two paradigms contests the role of international organizations in regard to their normative
and authoritative capacities to regulate international disputes.
The two megatheories presented in this work are not merely juxtaposed to claim which one
stands out as more contending or subject-relevant. Bearing in mind that substantial
criticism is mutually reflected in both paradigms, and that conflict and cooperation are
inherently significant concepts for both models, it would be prudent to apply them as
extensively as possible to ensure availability of vast amount of enriched theory. In doing
so, it becomes apparent that each paradigm prefers looking at a given phenomenon from a
different perspective. This raises the question of the so-called levels of analysis, initially
elaborated by Kenneth Waltz in one of his early works on the causes of war, where distinct
analytical spheres (individual, state and society, international system) are presented to
researchers for investigation.
15
Yet, the question which level should be considered when
investigating a particular phenomenon is equally essential for understanding where our
efforts should be projected in the first place.
14
Viotti and Kauppi assert that pluralism is often referred to as liberalism or as a liberal construct which
assumes international organizations as independent actors in their own right and not as a mere arena where
states compete (VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V, ibid, p. 7).
15
Waltz maintains that the question where one should look for major causes of war may
produce rather bewildering responses, and to make such a diversity manageable one can
order them under three headings: within man, within the structure of the separate states,
within the state system.
16
However, Holsti - apparently espousing Waltz's argument -
further claims that each [level] makes a contribution, but each fails to account for certain
aspects of reality that must be considered, and provides the following example:
One can describe the essence of the types of relations among Greek city-states without
examining the character of each city-state or the motives, ideals, and goals of each
statesman in each city-state. Today, the structure of alliances, power, domination,
dependence, and interdependence in the world sets limits upon the actions of states and
policy makers, no matter what their ideological persuasion or individual ideals are, and no
matter what the state domestic opinion is.
17
But such a response implies that all levels should be studied, and the resulting theory
would hardly be parsimonious. It is because of this riddle that much of the literature on
international relations constantly poses the question what should be examined within each
level of analysis, and how actors, structures, and variables relate to one another across
levels of analysis and over time.
18
However, tackling such questions is relatively
important not only for understanding the premises of dominant paradigms in international
relations theory but also for distinguishing between them as such.
The choice of realist and pluralist theories as theoretical basis for this work is not
accidental. Both paradigms, cultivated enormously throughout the second half of the
twentieth century, reflect on several functional aspects peculiar to the United Nations
before and following the Cold War. The world order in which the international community
found itself during the East-West confrontation was notably fit for realist images, whereas
the events of the late 1980s and beyond have granted considerable credence to liberal
thoughts and practices. These changes occurred parallel to novel developments in the
15
Ibid, p. 13.
16
WALTZ, Kenneth N., Man, the State, and War, in FREEDMAN, Lawrence (ed.), War, Oxford Univ.
Press, Oxford, New York, 1994, p. 75.
17
HOLSTI, K. J., International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, Prentice-Hall International (7
th
ed.),
New Jersey, 1995, p. 18.
18
VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V, op. cit., 1999, p. 15.
16
scholarly world as new theories gained ground, such as neorealism and neoliberal
institutionalism. Moreover, efforts were geared to find ways to 'neo-neo' synthesis in
search for more limited and precise assertions that could be reduced to simple analytical
statements amenable to tests and theory.
19
Wæver gives a clear account of this evolution
that he believes molds into one rational pole to be opposed to a more philosophical
enterprise known as reflectivism:
A dominant neo-neo synthesis became the research programme of the 1980s. No longer
were realism and liberalism 'incommensurable' - on the contrary they shared a 'rationalist'
research programme, a conception of science, a shared willingness to operate on the
premise of anarchy (Waltz) and investigate the evolution of co-operation and whether
institutions matter (Keohane).
20
What Wæver accounts for the search for more limited and precise assertions can be
attributed to the efforts in bringing more coherency into the international relations theory,
or at least in making some of its theories more parsimonious. However, viewing similar
attempts from another perspective may find clear references to Imre Lakatos's widely
publicized work Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research, which point to
critical issue of degeneration in theory development. Both, Popper and Lakatos admitted
that scientists often use a variety of strategies to save their theories from discovered
anomalies and looked for ways to decide when such moves could be considered
legitimate.
21
However, unlike Popper's concept of falsifiability (i.e. theories can be
refuted), Lakatos's model concentrated on a sequence of theories, what he called a
scientific research program, and which possessed a protective belt of auxiliary
hypotheses that could be adjusted or readjusted to discard anomalies contradicting the
hard core assumptions of the program. Although these moves imply survival strategies
through so-called intra- or inter-program problemshift (depending on whether only the
protective belt or the hard core of a scientific program should be adjusted), Lakatos's
19
WÆVER, Ole, Figures of international thought: introducing persons instead of paradigms, in WÆVER,
Ole NEUMANN, Iver (eds.), The Future of International Relations Theory: Masters in the Making?,
Routledge, New York, 1997, p. 18.
20
Ibid, pp. 18-19.
21
ELMAN et al., A Brief Guide to Imre Lakatos's Methodology of Scientific Research Programs, in
ELMAN, Colin FENDIUS ELMAN, Miriam (eds.), op. cit., 2003, p. 19.
17
quintessential argument remains that for theories to be progressive they should predict
novel facts and so avoid degeneration.
22
The interrelation between facts and theories, between empirical evidence and hypothetical
assumptions, has certainly produced heated debates among science philosophers for
decades. To give a reasonable explanation on their interdependence has proved to be
almost insurmountable even for Lakatos who instead moved to emphasize the evaluation
principle in order to get rid of the wrong theories.
23
Despite the permanently contested
predictive and explanatory roles of theories in the scientific enterprise, Waltz sounds
plausible when he maintains that to proceed by looking for associations without at least
some glimmering of a theory is like shooting a gun in the general direction of an invisible
target.
24
2.
Realism
Having leafed through numerous books and articles on international relations theory, it
wouldn't sound too controversial, if at all, to claim that realism has been one of the most
important approaches to elucidate world affairs. Indeed, realism has been the dominant
way of explaining international behavior until recently and still has many adherents.
25
From the antique to the present, from Thucydides to Morgenthau, philosophers, generals,
politicians and scholars have preoccupied themselves with understanding and explaining
underlying causes of state behavior, their motivations and expectations for waging wars,
seeking peace, and contemplating military, political and other forms of alliances among
themselves.
What has labeled this vast group of scholars and practitioners as realist strikes from the
very belief of its adherents as being realistic when looking at the world affairs as they are.
Yet this very labeling is argued to place other images in a disadvantaged position, while
22
Ibid, p. 20.
23
WALTZ, Kenneth N., Thoughts about Assaying Theories, in ELMAN, Colin FENDIUS ELMAN,
Miriam (eds.), op. cit., 2003, p. X (Foreword).
24
Cited in MOURITZEN, Hans, Kenneth Waltz: A Critical Rationalist between International Politics and
Foreign Policy in WÆVER, Ole NEUMANN, Iver (eds.), op. cit., 1997, p. 72. Original source: WALTZ,
K. N., Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill Humanities / Social Sciences / Languages, 1979, p. 15.
25
NICHOLSON, Michael, International Relations: A Concise Introduction, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1998,
p. 91.
18
hinting on unambiguous implications of their inherently unrealistic views and approaches
to explain state behavior. This is clearly presented on the case of idealism, or as
otherwise caustically termed utopianism, which has severely been castigated by realists
on the grounds that the latter shows what the world ought to be instead of telling us what it
is.
26
That is, what makes realists believe they have adopted an appropriate term for their
image is that realism closely approximates the world as it is.
27
The impossibility or
incapability of conceiving an alternative international system favoring lasting peace has
been boldly rebutted by Carr, who claimed rationalism can create a utopia, but [it] cannot
make it real.
28
The debate has extended into one of epistemological nature to invigorate
the longstanding position of realists, and to serve as a source of anomalies which liberalists
and institutionalists enthusiastically toss back.
2.1.
Major Actors and Assumptions
Although realism has attracted constant criticism from other competing approaches, it has
remained a solid enterprise in international relations theory mostly because of its inherent
descriptive, explanatory, and predictive strengths.
29
However, to understand the inherent
strengths of - in Lakatos' terms - a research program, it is necessary to look into its core
assumptions. Viotti and Kauppi identify four of them: states as principal or most important
actors (thus also key unit of analysis); states as unitary actors; states as rational actors;
and national security as high-politics.
30
Keohane similarly presents four assumptions he
deems to be fairly conventional, where - instead of mentioning states as unitary actors -
he underlines the anarchic nature of the world they operate in, while attributing particular
attention to states' propensity to maximize their security and their disinclined nature to
behave altruistically.
31
He also admits that institutional theory fully shares these
assumptions except that it does not take anarchy as a mere chaos with far-reaching
26
A more articulate and polarized contradiction between realism and idealism was explicated by: CARR,
Edward H., The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939. An Introduction to the Study of International Relations,
(MacMillan, 1995), where he openly criticizes the utopian nature of idealists who, following the devastating
impact of WWI, emerged as immediate adversaries of realism with strong beliefs in states' workable paths
toward a more peaceful international society.
27
VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V., op. cit., 1999, p. 82.
28
CARR, Edward H., op. cit., 1995, p. 29.
29
VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V., op. cit., 1999, pp. 82-83.
30
Ibid, pp. 6-7.
31
KEOHANE, Robert and MARTIN, Lisa, op. cit., 2003, pp. 73-74. Comp. also GRIECO, Joseph, The
Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union, and the Neo-Realist Research Program, in Review of
International Studies, Vol. 21, January 1995, p. 27.
19
negative implications for cooperation, and further claims that in contrast to liberal
international relations theory institutionalism embraces much of the hard core of
realism.
32
The fact that Keohane does not mention states as unitary actors is tactically
calculated to avoid being trapped between inter-paradigm debates, most specifically
between realism and liberalism, and their propensity to accentuate strictly defined state and
non-state actors, i.e. eludes discourses over individual vs. state levels of analysis. As we
will see later, adopting the realist unitary actor assumption has incurred high costs on the
institutional theory, later claimed by Keohane himself.
Following the classification of core assumptions by Viotti and Kauppi, the first point
claims that states are the principal or most important actors. States are undoubtedly
important actors in the international system, though just how important is a matter of
controversy.
33
Competing paradigms have somewhat different responses to this question;
what remains uncontested is that states have been central in the traditional view of
international relations, which is essentially the case for the realist approach. For the latter,
states are components of the international system - sovereignties with no overriding
institutions to control their actions and interactions. Since there is no authority to oversee
states' behavior, realists contend that the international system is of anarchic and self-help
nature, where states must elaborate and pursue their own security and survival strategies.
Thus, transnational and international organizations as well as multinational corporations
(MNCs), although acknowledged by realists, have always played a less significant role.
34
Nicholson maintains that from the political point of view states, as main actors, would
better describe the politics of the nineteenth century, and to some degree the Cold War era,
but this has considerably changed in the late twentieth century.
35
The second assumption is that states are unitary actors. Not only such a view is convenient
for theoretical applications
36
, realists view states as unitary because they believe no matter
32
KEOHANE, Robert and MARTIN, Lisa, op. cit., 2003, pp. 74-75.
33
NICHOLSON, Michael, op. cit., 1998, p. 15.
34
VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V., op. cit., 1999, p. 6.
35
NICHOLSON, Michael, op. cit., 1998, p. 15-16.
36
Considering states as unitary actors has been traditionally incorporated in realist works. However, in
structural realism as called by Keohane, Waltz applies states in terms of rational units - while
overlooking their inherent attributes - to provide reduced simplicity that would account for a larger
explanatory power of his theory (widely known as neorealism).
20
what differences occur over policy formation, hierarchical and authoritative state structures
will intervene to preclude bureaucratic end running and, if the issues are important
enough, they will obstruct actions by non-state actors and other subordinates to avoid
contradictions with centrally directed policies. The assumption is a classical realist
presentation of states as sovereign performers in the international system, albeit this
position has periodically invited substantial criticism from pluralists regarding the
overwhelming reification of the concept of state, i.e. treating the state as if it has a material
existence or as if it operates like a human being.
The third assumption refers to states as rational actors. Rationality presupposes that states
act rationally considering their internal capabilities and remaining vigilant of the anarchic
environment. Acting rationally also implies that while pursuing envisaged goals states
make value-maximizing decisions, which are accompanied by the logic of augmenting
benefits and reducing costs associated with the realization of these objectives.
37
Taking
into account lacking capabilities or disadvantaged position of a particular state within a
system suggests that it cannot or will not necessarily achieve its goals. However, if not
always the best, it is largely accepted that states will make the most acceptable and
satisfying decision among given alternatives. Since behavior is also bound to be
conditioned by observations made on interactions of other states and their positioning
within the system, Harrison argues that states - knowledgeable about the anarchic structure
and the rules it generates - are not entirely rational as claimed but equally imply reflexive
behavior.
38
Game theory and theories based on deterrence are perceived to be closely
linked to these assumptions.
The belief that national security tops the list of the international issues is the fourth
assumption. The security dilemma is quintessential for most realists and exerts immediate
connotations with the anarchical nature of the international system. The absence of
Hobbesian Leviathan in terms of central authority in international relations creates
insecurity and distrust among states. Therefore, the primary task of all states is to ensure
means for adequate protection of their territorial sovereignty and interests. These means, in
37
VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V., op. cit., 1999, p. 7
38
HARRISON, Ewan, Reassessing the Logic of Anarchy: Rationality versus Reflexivity, Univ. of
Edinburgh, International Studies Association, 2000, pp. 4-5.
21
traditional realist thinking, are pointing to military power.
39
As Morgenthau asserts, in
international politics in particular, armed strength as a threat or a potentiality is the most
important factor making for the political power of a nation.
40
Based on such thinking,
states are interested in expanding their military capabilities, which will in turn grant them
with the requisite power. By doing so, military power becomes an instrument to administer
international relations. In this regard, Carr elaborates the idea of what Clausewitz
explained by politics with other means:
Military power, being an essential element in the life of the state, becomes not only an
instrument, but an end in itself. Few of the important wars of the last hundred years seem
to have been waged for the deliberate and conscious purpose of increasing either trade or
territory. The most serious wars are fought in order to make one's own country militarily
stronger or, more often, to prevent another county from becoming militarily stronger, so
that there is much justification for the epigram that 'the principal cause of war is war
itself.
41
This line of argumentation, albeit not quite novel in the evolution of realist thinking, has
been fundamental in shaping views and positions on the extent of military power that has -
as immediate guarantor for survival in the anarchic world - superseded other notions of
power. In fact, for most realists, military strength has been instrumental in constructing
other theories compatible with the traditional realist thought - whether neorealism,
defensive realism, game theory, or deterrence theory. Why power is so important for
realism as well as other paradigms in international relations theory is further discussed in
the following chapter.
2.2. Power, Security, Stability
Power is an essential concept for realists, though ironically there is no clear consensus on
the definition of the term.
42
Viotti and Kauppi note that some realists understand power to
be the sum of military, technological, diplomatic, and other capabilities at the disposal of
39
It should be noted that many realists see economic, industrial or technological advances as essential
components of political power. Comp. CARR, Edward H., op. cit., 1995, p. 105
40
MORGENTHAU, Hans, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc, New York, 1973, p. 29.
41
CARR, Edward H., op. cit., 1995, p. 104.
42
VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V., op. cit., 1999, p. 64.
22
the state. Others see power as not as some absolute value (...) but, rather, as capabilities
relative to the capabilities of other states.
43
Yet, these static definitions are not enough
to explain where power springs from; mere capabilities or the fact of their being possessed
by states is not adequate for observing power relations in politics. Pondering upon this
phenomenon, Hannah Arendt illustrates her point on human relations:
Power is always, as we would say, a power potential and not an unchangeable, measurable,
and reliable entity like force or strength. While strength is the natural quality of an
individual seen in isolation, power springs up between men when they act together and
vanishes the moment they disperse.
44
It becomes apparent that for power to be somewhat tangible, interaction between states -
like between men on Arendt's example - is a prerequisite. It is in this socializing
environment where power can be inferred by observing states' behavior as they interact.
Thus, Viotti and Kauppi proceed to provide the basics for a dynamic definition, with
power focusing on states' interactions, and particularly on their willingness to use available
capabilities and control or influence other states.
45
The fundamental question as to why
states would strive for power and how the latter can be exercised have expeditiously led to
grand debates in international relations theory. However, at least relatively impromptu
responses should be provided at this stage. Since most states always interact with each
other for numerous purposes, acquiring the capacity to influence other states' behavior to
one's desired ends is inherently characteristic to realists' views of world politics. As
Morgenthau asserts, "international politics, like all other politics, is a struggle for
power.
46
In a rapidly growing interdependent world, there is less doubt to states' concerns
about their relatively advantageous positions outside the domestic realm, which in turn is
bound to create conducive conditions for the achievement of pursued goals.
Roughly having covered one part of the question, i.e. why states would seek direct or
indirect coercion of other states, the second part tackles capabilities needed to exercise
power. As already noted above, military power is central to traditional realism but is also
43
Ibidem
44
ARENDT, Hannah, The human condition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998, p. 200.
45
VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V., op. cit., 1999, pp. 64-65.
46
MORGENTHAU, Hans, op. cit., 1973, p. 27.
23
seen as just one component of power by many other adherents of this or other paradigms.
And if one sees power as the sum of military, economic, technological and other
capabilities, another question attempts to clarify how power - given such a multiplicity of
notions - can be measured and eventually applied to predicting the outcome of states'
interactions. Keohane contends that power capabilities can be rather good predictors, as
shown in works by Bueno de Mesquita, Organski and Snyder.
47
However, in relation
specifically to structural realism he equally adds that the desire for parsimonious theory
impels realists toward a unitary notion of power as homogenous and usable for a variety of
purposes, but close examination of complexities of world politics induces caution about
such an approach.
48
Indeed, predicting outcomes as a way to measure relative power of
states requires more than understanding capabilities to influence, and perhaps more so for
structural realists who seem to focus largely on systemic unit-structure analysis and
overlook potential factors originating within the units (states).
49
Distinguishing between capabilities may lead to distinct manifestations of power. Thus,
based on application choice, power practice may generate dissimilar effects. Joseph Nye,
reflecting on US recurrent unilateralism and its foreign policy ramifications, underscores
the need to differentiate between soft and hard power and examines their proper and timely
application. Whereas hard power, the ability to coerce, grows out of a country's military
might, Nye argues that soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture,
political ideals, and policies.
50
This approach parts from the traditional realist emphasis
on military might and considers alternative paths of influence in the battle of hearts and
minds, while increasing the chances of ingratiating political opponents. It follows that soft
power can potentially offer a breakthrough in the environment of competing interests.
Taking into account several instances of foreign policy making where soft power is seen as
unequivocally beneficial, Nye does not diminish the role of hard power and claims they
47
Capabilities used by these scholars in their quantitative analysis range from gross national product or
national income (Organsky and Kugler 1980, Chapter 2) to military, industrial, and demographic capacities
(Snyder et al. 1972, pp. 21-7). Bueno de Mesquita applied his so-called expected utility theory, which uses
composite capabilities but considers such parameters as distance, alliance relationships, and uncertainty
(1981, p. 151), cited in VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V., op. cit., 1999, p. 65.
48
KEOHANE, R. O., Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, 1983, in VIOTTI, Paul R.
KAUPPI, Mark V., op. cit., 1999, p. 169.
49
Comp. KRASNER, Stephen, Defending the National Interest, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, New
Jersey, 1978, p. 333.
50
NYE, Joseph, US Power and Strategy after Iraq in Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003, p. 66.
24
can also reinforce each other.
51
Although his primary focus in the article is the war in Iraq,
one cannot discard the relevance of soft power to the ultimate outcome of the Cold War.
Military power, or hard power as defined by Nye, is a strategic tool for the protection of
sovereign states. Its main function is conceived in safeguarding territorial integrity and
inhabitants of a state or, in other words, providing security. A rather casual deduction
would insist on states' continual armament. Understanding the limits to the quality and
quantity of armament based on individual states requires meticulous analysis supported by
empirical data. What remains uncontested from the historical point of view is that major
interests in military capabilities have been on the agenda of most countries worldwide.
Holsti claims that - except Costa Rica and Iceland - all states commit a significant (1 to 30
percent) proportion of their total economic output (GNP) for arms to maintain internal and
external security.
52
He makes a subtle differentiation between internal and external
security, though the implications are heavily thematic. One the one hand, in order to ensure
internal security, arms are exploited for the purpose of providing order within a state. Yet,
they may equally be utilized for sustaining tenure in power, when the latter may be
threatened to be overthrown by opposition forces. Violent repressions, restraints on mass
media, and assassinations have been systematically executed in the name of national
security.
53
For realists, internal security sustained by adequate military means is an
acceptable solution in all probability, since having to cope with two anarchic environments
is a plight rather tant pis. On the other hand, external security may justify external
aggression and so-called preemptive war. Given such an intricate nature of security,
advocates of global governance would most likely assure that the security dilemma of
today interweaves between the domestic and the foreign and the civil and the political.
54
Stockpiling of arms can be justified to counter internal and external threats. How legitimate
their exploitation, in what instances and under what circumstances, is also an ethical
question. What is perhaps important to pose at this stage is the question searching for
factors evoking a military response. Barry Buzan makes a useful distinction between
51
Ibid, p. 67.
52
HOLSTI, K. J., op. cit., 1995, p. 83.
53
Ibid, pp. 85-86.
54
DUFFIELD, Mark, Carry on Killing: Global Governance, Humanitarianism and Terror, DIIS Working
Paper 2004/23, p. 16.
25
threats and vulnerabilities.
55
In traditional realist thinking, vulnerabilities stem from
largely geographic characteristics, yet not entirely. North America, for example, has been
seen mainly invulnerable to attacks from other countries. However, throughout the Cold
War some degree of vulnerability existed due to ideological misperceptions and highly
sophisticated nuclear missiles. In the post 9/11 world terrorism has exposed the
vulnerability of a number of states where, given the transnational feature of this
phenomenon, geographical proximity seems to be largely irrelevant. Threats, in contrast,
are understood to be more immediate capabilities in the hands of adversaries that may be
used to exploit vulnerabilities.
56
These are often not explicit and self-evident, and may be
well contested because of their ambiguous definition; i.e. there is lacking universality
regarding their threatening nature. And because threats may reoccur anytime in the future,
Holsti asserts that military forces will be necessary as a form of insurance against the
future. This may partly clarify the willingness of so many states to allocate considerable
percentage of their budgets to acquiring and developing military capabilities.
The other line of the argument evolves around disarmament. Hedley Bull, one of the
leading students of the English School, maintains that disarmament as an idea of absolute
security from war is an allusion [emphasis added].
57
He presents the debate on security
and disarmament in two forms: the stronger and the weaker. The former is a doctrine
advocating absolute disarmament as a way of making wars physically impossible, whereas
the weaker form is believed to make wars less likely. Bull conceives of both forms with
their germane implications for the international system. His assumptions of absolute
disarmament rest on the belief that such a process would lead to a primitive level, where
no guarantee for the resumption of arms race exists, and where attendant circumstances of
unpredictability and surprise would contribute to the international insecurity.
58
It is not
surprising that his arguments in relation to the weaker form of the doctrine would to a large
degree restrict moral or ethical deliberations. Although Bull acknowledges the relevance of
follow-up actions on arms reduction based on multilateral agreements, he contends that
55
BUZAN, Barry, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold
War Era, L. Rienner Publishers (2nd ed.), 1991, p. 112.
56
HOLSTI, K. J., op. cit., 1995, p. 85.
57
BULL, Hedley, Disarmament and the Balance of Power in FREEDMAN, Lawrence (ed.), op. cit., 1994,
p. 299.
58
Ibid, pp. 298-300.
26
such agreements fall short of the abolition of all categories of weapons and are
compromised based on economic grounds and the scope of permissibility forged by the
balance of power:
It is clear that if the objective of arms control were the economic one of reducing the
resources devoted to armaments, it would have to compromise a reduction of armaments
and armed forces, or, at all events, a reduction of expenditure on them. If, however, it is the
objective of arms control to promote international security, it is far from clear that this is a
matter of reducing the quantity of forces or weapons, or restricting the sums spent on them.
(...) The claims of the reduction of armaments clash with those of the balance of power,
and must be weighed against them.
59
By shifting the emphasis from disarmament issue to the notion of balance of power, Bull
sees security preconditioned by the latter, which in turn is claimed to have a function: to
preserve independence of sovereign states (...), if necessary, by war.
60
Thus, according to
Bull, disarmament is not a relevant key concept for maintaining international security,
whereas arms can be utilized to sustain or overthrow an existing balance. Since balance of
power is thought in conjunction with the anarchic system, advocates of another brand of
realism, namely of defensive realism, maintain that security is readily available if states
adopt defensive strategies only, and that the international system already provides cautious
and restrained behavior on the part of states.
61
How reserved states' might find themselves
in exercising their military capabilities as a way to ensure both internal and external
security is a question that tends to consider multiple factors ranging from economical
development to political system and others.
In spite of divergent definitions and views on power of balance as a concept,
62
and its
extensive explanatory efforts based on such notions as bipolarity and multipolarity, balance
of power is an essential source for explaining or predicting more or less pacific behavior of
states or, in other words, serves for realists' understanding of stability in the international
59
Ibid, p. 300.
60
Ibid, p. 301.
61
VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V., op. cit., 1999, p. 69.
62
As identified by Viotti and Kauppi, Hans Morgenthau defines power of balance in four different ways
whereas another critic discerns eight meanings of the term. See VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V., op.
cit., 1999, p. 85.
27
system. Morgenthau shows that the balance of power is attained through the aspiration of
power on the part of several nations, each trying either to maintain or overthrow the status
quo.
63
Close observation is demanded here to discern stability in such relations since
maintaining or overthrowing the status quo is not very much implicative for peaceful
relations. Conversely, stability may be observed when power aspirations are leveled off on
both sides of the scale and maintain minimum or nonexistent incentives to tip the balance.
This condition is often described as equilibrium. However, since lasting equilibrium has
fewer chances in the anarchic system understood by realists, international stability is
provided mainly through successful counterbalance strategies between two superpowers in
a bipolar world, and among regional powers in a multipolar system.
Waltz claims the bipolar world has provided more stability since the relations and behavior
between the two poles were relatively simple and predictable.
64
Such convictions stem
from the belief that uncertainty increases with increasing number of actors in the
international system. John Mearsheimer took the argument onto a more pessimistic level
and predicted a rather troublesome outcome for Europe in the aftermath of the Soviet
breakup. His contemplated ramifications included a dangerous scenario with nuclear
proliferation on the European continent with no powers overseeing the balance.
65
In
Mearsheimer's imagination such a scenario would substantially destabilize the world.
Singer and Deutsch, on the contrary, contend that the increase in number of independent
actors diminishes the share [of attention] that any nation can allocate to any other single
actor.
66
Based on this assumption, a multipolar system offers more credentials for a stable
world since, given the complexity of relations, a regional power will refrain from
questioning the power of its competitors, thus risking to provoke unprecedented reactions
from a number of regional powers.
What seems to be convincing is that both in bipolar and multipolar systems states seek to
expand power or deter threats not only through stockpiling of arms but by building
63
MORGENTHAU, Hans, op. cit., 1973, p. 167.
64
Comp. et al. MOURITZEN, Hans, op. cit., in WÆVER, Ole NEUMANN, Iver (eds.), op. cit., 1997, p.
70.
65
MEARSHEIMER, John, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War in FREEDMAN,
Lawrence (ed.), op. cit., 1994, pp. 303-307.
66
Cited in VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V., op. cit., 1999, pp. 74-75.
28
alliances. As Holsti notes, common strategy for reducing vulnerabilities or diminishing
threats is to augment military power, not just by building up one's own capabilities, but by
enlisting the aid of others.
67
However, for alliances to form, a common shared threat has
to be identified by states seeking to bolster their capabilities through mutual commitments
and integration of forces. These strategies are deeply rooted in the behavior of states and
are habitually featured in international relations. They have always served to
counterbalance other major powers or alliances considered to be threatening. Indeed, as
Morgenthau asserts, balance of power ... is to be found not in the equilibrium of two
isolated nations but in the relations between one nation or alliance of nations and other
alliance. Hence, maintaining balance of power through alliance formation and other
counterbalancing strategies is paramount for preserving international stability in both
traditional realist thought and its offspring enterprise widely known as neorealism. How
the latter parts from the preceding one is illuminated below.
2.3. Neorealism
The term neorealism has been prevailing in much of international relations theory literature
throughout the past decade. It has been associated with one of the most quoted scholars in
the branch, Kenneth Waltz, who shaped realism in its scientific form by theorizing
concepts inherently rooted in this enterprise.
68
It is nearly impossible to provide a complete
view of the debate on neorealism along with relevant criticism on just a few pages.
However, the following passages attempt to shed light on some fundamentals featuring
neorealism as a distinct theory of international relations.
Realism was often criticized for its unscientific approach to explaining international
relations and, in particular, to explaining and predicting states' behavior. Viotti and Kauppi
note that earlier criticisms of the realist literature were very often based on the contention
that such concepts as balance of power had less to do with theory building and more to do
with ideology and self-justification of one particular approach to conducting international
relations.
69
As positivist social science was taking ground, the need to construct a formal
67
HOLSTI, K. J., op. cit., 1995, p. 89.
68
The fundamental departure of neorealism from its traditional thought was achieved by Waltz with his work
titled A Theory of International Politics, first published in 1979.
69
VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V., op. cit., 1999, p. 87.
29
theory was becoming tangible. Wæver assents this point against a larger picture of
interparadigmatic debates in international relations theory:
What is truly new about neo-realism is its concept of science. General speculation and
reflection in the classical realist style are no longer sufficient. Realism has to express itself
in the form of theory, of a system of clearly specified sentences (...) [T]he shift from
realism to neo-realism can be seen as a delayed and displaced victory for the 'scientific'
side of the second debate.
70
What made neorealism considerably scientific was achieved by Waltz through reducing
the scope of his analysis to the international system level and elaborating an abstract
systemic explanation of international politics. Systemic does not merely presuppose intense
concentration on the anarchic system as such; it signifies enduring and coherent
explanation of states' behavior with recurrent and analogous systemic outcomes. However,
for outcomes to be ordered and systematic, Waltz arranges the units within a structure.
Structure is an essential concept in Waltz's theory. Keohane presents three major elements
peculiar to this structure, where the first two are given as constant: first, the international
system is anarchic rather than hierarchic; second, the system is characterized by
interaction among units with similar functions; third, there is a distribution of
capabilities across the states in the system [emphasis added].
71
The distribution of power
capabilities accounts for the modality of the system and cannot be taken as constant since,
by implication and accordingly, the nature of the system may vary based on power
distribution between or among the units. Whether the system is unipolar, bipolar, or
mutlipolar may be inferred by close observation of the distribution of capabilities, where
the most significant are those of the most powerful actors.
72
One of the biggest challenges neorealism has been facing from pluralists as well as from a
handful of institutionalists can be attributed to Waltz's negligent approach to consider
domestic influences on foreign policy making. This position can be ascribed to states'
70
WÆVER, Ole, et al., "Figures of international thought: introducing persons instead of paradigms", in
WÆVER, Ole NEUMANN, Iver (eds.), op. cit. 1997, p. 17.
71
KEOHANE, R. O., Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, 1983, in VIOTTI, Paul R.
KAUPPI, Mark V., op. cit., 1999, p. 158.
72
Ibid, p. 159.
30
identical functions as conditioned by the system. As Waltz claims, states are alike in the
tasks they face, though not in the ability to perform them. The difference is in the
capability not in the function.
73
Although reduced simplicity accounts for superior
explanatory power in Waltz's theory,
74
it leaves behind some unstated assumptions or
ambiguities that could be defined as anomalies in Lakatos' terms. For example, Keohane
identifies inconsistencies in Waltz's assumptions that range from states as rational actors to
balance of power vs. states as maximizers. He links the latter with what has previously
been said about states' inherent attributes and their lacking status in Waltz's systemic
theory:
The assumption of power maximization makes possible strong inferences about behavior
that would be impossible if we assumed only that states sometimes or often sought to
aggrandize themselves. In that case, we would have to ask about competing goals ...
generated by the internal social, political, and economical characteristics of the countries.
Taking into account these goals relegates Structural Realism to the status of partial,
incomplete theory.
75
Another vigorous criticism on the balance of power came from Stephen Walt, who
reiterated a new position through his balance of threat theory. Walt contends that states
balance themselves not only against the most powerful ones, but they do so against other
states posing substantial threat, and that this approach offers more historically correct
explanations.
76
Like many other critics, Richard Ashley further argues that the worldview
neorealist writers present is rather self-enclosed [and] self-affirming.
77
It is self-enclosed
and self-affirming because it subordinates all issues to a concern for control and survival
of [the] state system ... and trivializes alternative conceptions of world order.
78
Defying neorealism on these grounds illustrates the nature of a systemic theory; i.e.
outcomes are recurrent and conditioned by the system. This clearly accounts for large
73
WALTZ, K. N., op. cit., 1979, p. 96.
74
Comp. MOURITZEN, Hans, op. cit., in WÆVER, Ole NEUMANN, Iver (eds.), op. cit. 1997, pp. 79-81.
75
KEOHANE, R. O., op. cit., 1983, cited in VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V., op. cit., 1999, pp. 163-
164.
76
VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V., op. cit., 1999, p. 76.
77
ASHLEY, Richard, The Poverty of Neorealism, in International Organization 38, no. 2, spring 1984,
(pp. 225-86), p. 228, cited in VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V., op. cit., 1999, p. 87.
78
Ibidem
31
degree of self-explanation and predictability. But isn't this what a successful parsimonious
theory is about? The debate obviously tends to elevate itself to methodological heights.
However, Waltz would have most likely taken this question as an answer and - provided
that his skepticism toward a more robust research program is relatively substantiated
79
- his
arguments would not only serve as a protective belt in Lakatos' terms but also well enough
for his systemic theory. This is possible for one obvious reason - both approaches are two
different tools belonging to one common methodological enterprise known as positivism.
Yet, the most stringent criticism pouring upon neorealism combines the alleged
reproductive nature of a systemic theory with its pessimistic views on possible
fundamental changes within the system. The issue has been notoriously disturbing for
many realists and an invigorating weapon in the hands of its adversaries. It traces its
origins back to the first debate in the international relations theory, between realists and
idealists, and is worth taking a somewhat meticulous look to allow lucid apprehension of
their current standings.
2.4.
System and Change
Defining the international system has not been an easy task as many scholars have come to
understand it in different ways: some see it as being composed of states and other actors,
whereas others see it in terms of world capitalism - a system composed of classes with
conflicting interests.
80
What has seemingly found common elements embracing the notion
of system both among realists and idealists was its perception in terms of continual
interaction and interrelation of states in an exclusively anarchic or otherwise environment.
How and to what extent the anarchic international system could be transformed is a
question cleaving adherents of both images. As indicated above, anarchy is understood as
the absence of a supreme body that would subordinate all states and ascribe the system a
hierarchical structure.
The acknowledgment of an external anarchic environment is one of the principal
assumptions upon which the realist image is based. It has prompted realists to see origins
of war not inherited in the irrational behavior of states but in a lacking authoritative
79
See WALTZ, K. N. op. cit., 2003, in ELMAN, Colin FENDIUS ELMAN, Miriam (eds.), op. cit., 2003
32
institution in the first place. As Waltz has succinctly formulated, wars occur because there
is nothing to prevent them.
81
Idealists, on the other hand, concede to the absence of an
authoritative body in the international system but take the issue onto another level and
contemplate creation of such a body to allow harmonious coexistence of states. Espousing
Kantian philosophy and epitomizing aftereffects of large and small wars, idealists believe
in the rationale and capacity of humankind to achieve - if not a cosmopolitan world society
based on universally accepted moral values - then at least a platform upon which conflicts
may be resolved through nonviolent means and based on international law.
Distinct approaches to grasping the possibility of change are reflected in is vs. should
controversy. Realism is reluctant to see transformation of the system because the latter
tends to undermine the is tenet. The abstention is also characterized by other factors
endemic to the system nature, most notably in neorealism, where the international system
entails deterministic values in relation to states. Waltz sees transformation of the
international system possible if its ordering principle shifts from anarchy to hierarchy, but
this is rather unlikely because of the anti-hegemonial character of the balance of power
mechanism.
82
And as long as international relations are defined by states pursuing their
own interests in a self-help environment, weather striving to achieve balance or undermine
the hegemony, the prospects of transforming the international system as perceived by
realists are minimal or non-existent. This view, however, has been challenged by others on
the grounds that [state] interests are not simply 'out there' waiting to be discovered, but are
constructed through social interaction.
83
Thus, transformation is contingent on values
filtered out through policymaking processes and takes account of most successful and
articulate actors. Whether states will eventually abandon or behold traditional means for
defining or materializing interests against a perceived anarchic world depends on what
incentives and concessions will be offered by those interest groups attempting to moderate
the somewhat overrunning reified notion of state and its way of conducting high politics.
Put otherwise, much of the critique realists have had to face all this time is their reluctance
80
VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V., op. cit., 1999, p. 496.
81
See WALTZ, K. N., Man, the State and War, Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1959, p. 233.
82
WALTZ, K. N., (1986b, p. 343), cited in HARRISON, Ewan, 2000, p. 6.
83
See FINNEMORE, Martha, National Interests in International Society, 1996, in VIOTTI, Paul R.
KAUPPI, Mark V., op. cit., 1999, p. 86.
33
to engage in conceiving an alternative world as a possible outcome of cognitive and
judicious treatment of the existing anarchy both on practical and scholarly levels.
84
However, it should also be noted that attempts to find a middle ground have been equally
made by theorists. Most evidently the debates contemplating possible synthesis between
neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism in the '90s were given much attention due to
their receptive dialogue and commonly shared assumptions. Keohane's theorizing of
institutions and its accumulating significance has left neither realists nor liberalists
unruffled. The key source of such attention might have come from the functional aspects
Keohane attached to institutions and their role as important actors in the international
system. Whether institutions are sought to replenish the anarchic system through
cooperation for collective security or commonly envisioned benefits, the overarching
implication is that if there is a void to be filled by any order other than anarchy, then
numerous regional, transnational, international governmental and non-governmental
organizations as well as regimes in their entire diversity have a role to play. How important
non-state actors are in shaping international politics, how state and non-state interests are
being formed and transformed both on domestic and international levels are questions
meticulously considered by another major paradigm known as pluralism.
3.
Pluralism
Pluralism is a term closely associated with liberalism and both are often used
interchangeably. In classical liberalism the individual is the most important unit of analysis
and the state has a minimal role in a society, mainly acting as "arbiter in disputes between
individuals and ensuring the maintenance of conditions under which individuals can enjoy
their rights to the fullest."
85
In other words, the individual takes precedence as the primary
agent in the configuration of social and political life. Pluralism, on the other hand, is a
useful term since it emphasizes the multiplicity of actors and the diversity of issues
84
Although the majority of realists - seeing states as primary actors and their interaction and interrelation in
an anarchic environment as defining elements of the international system - do not consider transformation to
be a feasible outcome, it may not necessarily be the view of others. Gilpin, for example, concedes to the
argument that the nature and pattern of relations among states are the most important determinants of the
character of international relations (...) [does not] presume that the nature of the state need always be the
same and that the contemporary nation-state is the ultimate form of political organization. See GILPIN,
Robert, Richness of Political Realism, International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2, Spring 1984, p. 300,
cited in VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V., ibidem.
34
embracing international politics. It attempts to expose how these actors and issues are
interlinked with each other and to what extent they may be interdependent. As Holsti
asserts, "proponents [of pluralism] would deny that the analyst can abstract from a
complex web of interrelationships between societies only their political-security aspects. In
the modern global system, all policy sectors are intertwined and affect each other."
86
Little
further asserts that the label itself is drawn from political science and applies to a school
of thought that defines politics in terms of the interaction among competing interest groups
and largely deprives the state of any independent status.
87
Therefore, pluralism can be
considered to adhere to an essentially liberal and anti-realist view of the state.
88
Moreover, pluralism is conveniently used in this work to underscore the role of non-state
actors in shaping international politics as well as to illustrate decision-making processes as
part of a more intricate domain of foreign policy making.
3.1.
Major Actors and Assumptions
Scholars have apparently adopted different taxonomical approaches to classify major
actors and assumptions found in pluralism. Viotti and Kauppi, for example, identify four of
them: non-state actors are important entities; the state is not a unitary actor; the state
cannot be taken as a rational actor; the agenda of international politics is extensive.
89
Another leading scholar of the liberalist thought, Andrew Moravcsik - while applying the
levels of analysis model prevalent in international relations theory - examines the nature of
actors, of the state, and that of the international system as seen through the lenses of
liberalism.
90
He further provides three strands of liberalism deriving from three potential
motivations accordingly: ideational as stemming from divergent fundamental beliefs;
commercial as tackling scarcity of material goods; and republican when considering
inequalities in political power.
91
Whether such expansion of analytical spheres is deliberate
or not, it exerts powerful implications on the necessity to investigate issues which have
85
VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V., op. cit., 1999, p. 201.
86
HOLSTI, K. J., op. cit., 1995, p. 8.
87
LITTLE, Richard, The Growing Relevance of Pluralism? in SMITH, Steve, BOOTH, Ken
ZALEWSKI, Marysia (eds.) International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, Cambridge Univ. Press,
Cambridge, 1996, p. 68.
88
Ibidem.
89
VIOTTI, Paul R. KAUPPI, Mark V., op. cit., 1999, pp. 199-201.
90
MORAVCSIK, A., Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assessment in ELMAN, Colin
FENDIUS ELMAN, Miriam (eds.), op. cit., 2003, pp. 159-167.
91
Ibid., pp. 162-163.
35
traditionally been beyond the margins of power politics. Although distinct models for
classification by scholars may account for a variety of focal points, most of them do
incorporate the following core assumptions in their discussions on pluralism.
As claimed by Viotti and Kauppi, non-state actors are significant. This assumption is
fundamental and occupies a central theme in pluralism. Contrary to realism, pluralists de-
emphasize state as the primary actor but do not neglect its role as important. Holsti everts
the argument more explicitly:
States are important, for they set the rules of economic, communications, technology, and
other games that occur simultaneously. But by themselves, they do not set the international
agenda, nor can they make decisions as if removed from the interests, values, and
aspirations of millions of business firms, banks, shipping companies, political parties,
citizens' groups, and the like.
92
How interests and values eventually shape policies requires prudent examination of
domestic politics. What one may extract from Holsti's explanation is that the state itself is
not a unitary actor. It rather embodies numerous actors with conflicting interests struggling
for the breakthrough and accomplishment of their objectives, while seeking formal
acknowledgement and protection from a representative institution acting on the highest
level of the hierarchy and in the name of the state. Moravcsik claims that "this pluralist
premise assumes neither that all individuals and groups have equal influence on state
policy, nor that the structure of state institutions is irrelevant."
93
His contention is based on
the belief that "every government represents some individuals and groups more fully than
others" and therefore "political institutions can be of decisive importance."
94
Whether and
why some individuals or groups are more influential and better represented than others is
largely dependent on the composition of actors, the strategies applied when pursuing
certain goals, the nature of the objectives and the environment in which they perform. Thus
the state is not an independent and unitary actor with its own agenda. Its actions and
decisions are continually shaped by those upholding the hierarchical structure from the
92
HOLSTI, K. J., op. cit., 1995, p. 8.
93
MORAVCSIK, A., op. cit., in ELMAN, Colin FENDIUS ELMAN, Miriam (eds.), op. cit., 2003, p. 163.
94
Ibidem.
36
ground levels an approach that can plausibly be ascribed to the traditional "bottom-up"
view of liberalism. It follows that the pluralist as well as liberalist critique toward realism
is sustained not only because of the latter's somewhat extreme reified interpretation of state
but equally due to its apathetic stand in relation to non-state actors.
The next major pluralist assumption is that states are neither unitary nor rational actors.
Although Viotti and Kauppi present these assumptions somewhat distinctly, both are
closely associated and substantially interlinked. As put explicitly above, the state cannot be
assumed as unitary and rational since the competition among interest groups will eventuate
in a suboptimal decision,
95
which is rather a product of compromised bargaining and
negotiations. Here the critique launched against realism rests both on domestic and
international levels. Little contends that from the pluralist perspective the state is deprived
of any autonomous role and is not responsible for the formulation of a national
interest.
96
Hence it acts as an orchestral conductor whose role is not to make music, but
to coordinate the activities of the musicians.
97
It may be argued that in strictly autocratic
governments (North Korea, Libya, etc) there will be little if no chance for any competition
among interest groups. However, similar exceptional cases have found no significant
scholarly attention in liberalist policy analysis.
Seen through the prism of domestic politics, the argument seems to be little contestable. To
what degree such interpretation can be transcended onto the international level is a
stimulating debate for the adherents of both paradigms. While realists see the international
system mainly composed of states interacting with each other, pluralists emphasize the
growing significance of non-state actors and the fragmented nature of the state in both
domestic and foreign policy making. These actors restrict the autonomy and authority of
states by creating all sorts of transnational coalitions, which may well be in the position to
95
Unlike the optimal (understood as the best possible outcome in the context of decision-making),
suboptimal decision is perceived as less than the best choice or outcome. Although it may be good enough,
the implication here is that it takes into account other preferences and is therefore adjusted to avoid serious
confrontation from other competing groups.
96
LITTLE, Richard, op. cit., in SMITH, Steve, BOOTH, Ken ZALEWSKI, Marysia (eds.) op. cit., 1996,
p. 71.
97
Ibid, p. 72. Original source: NICHOLLS, David, Three Varieties of Pluralism, MacMillan, London, 1974,
p. 22.
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