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Büchler, Jan-Philipp: Towards an Integrative Approach to Alliance Failure
Druck Diplomica GmbH, Hamburg, 2006
Zugl.: Universität zu Köln, Diplomarbeit, 2003
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i
Contents
Contents ... i
List of figures ...iii
List of tables...iii
Abbreviations... iv
1 Introduction...
1
1.1 Research problem... 2
1.2 Procedure of the analysis ... 3
2 Alliances as a third form of coordination ...
5
2.1 The nature of alliances ... 6
2.2 Different forms... 8
2.3 Goals and motives... 10
2.4 Alliance life cycle ... 14
2.5 Success and risk factors ... 17
2.6 Alliance outcomes... 21
2.6.1 Problems of performance measurement... 21
2.6.2 Defining alliance failure... 23
3 Development of a framework for the analysis of
alliance failure ... 25
3.1 Theoretical development of a framework ... 26
3.2 Review of the existing approaches to alliance failure... 32
3.2.1 Environmental
approaches... 32
3.2.2 Strategic
approaches ... 34
3.2.3 Structure determined approaches ... 36
3.2.4 Behaviorist
approaches ... 40
3.3 Interdependence of determinants for alliance failure... 45
3.4 Synthesis ... 50
ii
4 Integrated approach to alliance failure... 53
4.1 Driving forces of alliance performance (environment)... 54
4.2 Alliance strategy for competitive advantage (strategy) ... 57
4.3 Alliance governance, organization structure and
resources (structure)... 61
4.4 Alliance culture and process (behavior)... 64
4.5 Synthesis ... 66
5 Conclusion and future perspectives... 68
Bibliography ... 71
iii
List of figures
Figure 1: Numbers of alliances formed in selected industries ... 1
Figure 2: Strategic alliances as a third form of coordination... 5
Figure 3: Forms of alliances by direction of integration... 9
Figure 4: Taxonomy of alliance forms... 10
Figure 5: Motives for strategic alliance formation... 11
Figure 6: Motives for cooperation along the value chain ... 14
Figure 7: Linear life cycle model of alliance evolution ... 15
Figure 8: Dynamic life cycle model of alliance evolution... 16
Figure 9: Survey results: Alliance success factors... 18
Figure 10: Failure of strategic alliances... 23
Figure 11: Forms of termination of strategic alliances ... 24
Figure 12: Systemic conception of an integrated framework ... 29
Figure 13: Integrated framework for the analysis of
alliance failure ... 30
Figure 14: Forms of coordination, transaction costs,
and asset specificity... 37
Figure 15: Alignment of key failure drivers to alliance junctions ... 53
Figure 16: Interdependences of failure drivers ... 54
Figure 17: Integrated approach to alliance failure ... 67
Figure 18: Use of different forms of alliances ... 69
List of tables
Table 1: Characteristics of different governance modes... 7
Table 2: Key drivers of alliance failure by theory ... 44
iv
Abbreviations
BA - British
Airways
cp.
-
compare
EDI -
Electronic Data Interface
e.g. -
exempli gratia
esp. -
especially
etc. -
et cetera
i.e.
-
id est
IT - Information
technology
JV
-
Joint Venture
M&A -
Merger and acquisition
R&D -
Research and development
vs. - versus
1
1 Introduction
The past decade has seen increased academic interest in strategic alliances
because alliances have developed to a centerpiece of corporate strategy.
1
The number of newly formed alliances has been growing at more than 25
percent annually throughout the last decade.
2
Most large companies have
at least 30 alliances, and many have more than 100 in their alliance portfo-
lio
3
. According to empirical studies about 90 percent of the questioned
companies are embedded one or more alliances, which seem to be prolif-
erating with increasing competition and globalization.
4
Thus, the competi-
tion between single firms gave way to the global competition between
strategic alliances.
5
Figure 1: Numbers of alliances formed in selected industries
6
The figure above illustrates the increase in the use of alliances as an ex-
ample of four selected industries throughout the last decades.
1
Cp. C
HILD
/ F
AULKNER
(1998), p. 4; B
AMFORD
/ G
OMES
-C
ASSERES
/ R
OBINSON
(2003) p. 1; moreover R
IEHLE
(1997), p. 581, explaining the importance of alli-
ances in a global context; H
AGEDOORN
/ S
CHAKENRAAD
(1990) find that alli-
ances are within the core business of many firms.
2
Cp. B
LEEKE
/ E
RNST
(1995); Y
OSHINO
/ R
ANGAN
(1995).
3
Cp. B
AMFORD
/ E
RNST
(2002); also G
ULATI
(1998).
4
Cp. E
GGS
/ E
NGLERT
(2000); esp. the airline industry illustrates the importance
and advantages of complex alliances as shown by G
ALLACHER
/ W
OOD
(1998)
as well as the alliances of the global car manufactures, whereas here more often
direct equity investments play a major role.
5
Cp. G
OMES
-C
ASSERES
(1996), p. 53; also P
ICOT ET AL
. (2001), p. 3.
6
Source: Based on data collected at the Maastricht Economic Research Institute
on Innovation and Technology presented by H
AGEDOORN
(1993).
2
1.1 Research problem
Yet despite the ubiquity of strategic alliances, reality shows that many
alliances fail, i.e. they do not meet the goals of the parent companies. They
fall short of expectation for different reasons that mean alliances do not
perform as intended.
7
Over the years, empirical research has shown that
between 30 percent and 70 percent of alliances fail.
8
H
UNT
and
M
ORGAN
state that as many as one-third of alliances may be "outright failures."
9
Improving alliance performance, thus lowering failure rates requires a
comprehensive and complete understanding of strategic alliances.
Although a number of theoretical approaches as well as empirical studies
have developed possible answers for the understanding of alliance failure
by examining single factors, the review of the existing literature and inves-
tigation into the different theories shows that the reasoning is of a narrow
view.
10
To date, researchers mostly pay attention to individual aspects, but
do not hold a holistic perspective.
11
The mentioned studies attribute failure
to a wide range of factors including cultural, technical, financial, struc-
tural, and strategic aspects. The identified factors are neither wrong nor
right but based on different assumptions and views that still remain un-
classified, unstructured and incomparable. Due to overlaps, imprecise
terms and a missing conceptual framework, the outcome is very limited in
terms of explanation of alliance failure. Thus, the literature on alliance
7
Cp. D
AS
/ T
ENG
(2003).
8
Cp. B
AMFORD
/ G
OMES
-C
ASSERES
/ R
OBINSON
(2003) p. 1; an extensive over-
view of results of more than forty empirical studies has been given by B
LAN-
CHOT
/ M
AYRHOFER
(1998); also P
ARKHE
(1991, 1993) supports these findings
in several empirical investigations. I
NKPEN
/ B
EAMISH
(1997) estimate instability
rates of around 50 percent. K
OGUT
(1988a) finds that, in the case of research and
development (R&D) alliances, 57 percent are likely to fail.
9
Cp. H
UNT
/ M
ORGAN
(1994), p. 23.
10
Cp. D
AS
/ T
ENG
(2000a), p. 81-82, for an extensive overview of theoretical ap-
proaches to alliance failure. Empirical research distinguishes between several
different broad factors such as overly optimistic, poor communication, slow re-
sults or payback, lack of communication, financial or cultural mismatch as in
M
ILES
/ S
NOW
(1991, 1992);
D
ataquest data in "The Alliance Analyst", based on
a survey of 455 CEOs as shown in G
OMES
-C
ASSERES
(1999); similar results are
presented by F
RANCE
(2001).
11
The expression holistic perspective is applied here in the sense of comprehen-
sive or overarching. It does not refer to the philosophical concept of holism in
this context.
3
failure does not provide an adequate view of the interdependence and sys-
tem of the identified factors.
Furthermore, researchers have not developed a multidimensional and sys-
tematic framework for the analysis of alliance failure so far. The impor-
tance of the interdependence amongst different alliance failure factors is
not reflected in the existing literature.
Due to the high rate of failure of strategic alliances and the lack of a sys-
tematic and coherent understanding of the influencing factors of failure,
the theoretical development of an integrated approach to alliance failure is
more than overdue for scientific research.
The objective of this thesis is to enhance the understanding of alliance
failure. To this end, three sub-goals are derived:
(1) Development of a multidimensional and coherent framework for fur-
ther analysis of alliance failure. This framework will contain all of the
identified factors for the success and failure of alliances.
(2) Description of the interdependence amongst the dimensions of this
framework.
(3) Depiction of an integrative model of alliance failure taking the in-
terdependences into account.
1.2 Procedure of the analysis
This thesis consists of five major parts. After the introduction to the topic
of strategic alliances and their failure, the second chapter focuses on a
classification of alliances within the context of interorganizational forms
of cooperation, i.e. as a third form of coordination aside from market and
hierarchy. The basic nature of alliances is shown and the different forms
of alliances are explained as well as the goals and motives for their forma-
tion. The understanding of the life cycle of alliances gives an insight into
the dynamic evolution and change of alliances. Throughout the life cycle
an alliance has to manage different success and risk factors driving alli-
ance success or failure. The analysis of these factors along the life cycle of
4
an alliance also lays the foundation for the definition of alliance failure
due to a certain understanding of the outcome of alliances.
The development of a framework for the analysis of alliance failure is the
purpose of the third chapter. The framework interprets strategic alliances
as systems consisting of at least two individual companies. They have an
individual structure and they strive for their goals and strategies, the rela-
tionship among them, and the environmental constraints. This fourfold
framework allows the classification of the existing approaches to alliance
failure to the separate dimensions, thus capturing all separately identified
factors. Afterwards, setting each of the dimensions as the prevailing de-
terminant, whilst describing the influence on the other dimensions, shows
the interdependences of the four dimensions on two different levels: sin-
gle-firm level and alliance level. The third chapter closes with a synthesis
dealing with the question of fit of the four dimensions and their influence
on alliance performance by examining to what extent the junctions of the
four dimensions might contain risk and failure factors on the alliance
level.
The fourth chapter offers a first sketch of an integrated approach to alli-
ance failure according to the theoretically developed framework. It allows
situation-based hypotheses of alliance failure by offering functional chains
of cause and effect of each interdependent factor. The interdependences
between the networked junctions of the four dimensions will be closely
examined on the alliance level in order to understand the dynamics of the
failure factors. Finally, a synthesis of the fit of the different dimensions
and the integration of these dimensions that provide failure drivers present
a systemic and multidimensional approach to alliance failure analysis in
the last part of the fourth chapter.
The fifth and final chapter concludes with a summary of the outcome of
this approach, reflects it critically and describes the implications for fur-
ther research into strategic alliances. It also questions if different forms
and sizes of alliances could result in different constellations of failure
drivers, thus providing more or less stability of the alliance.
5
2 Alliances as a third form of coordination
For a long time, network organizations
12
have been viewed as a hybrid
mode of governance falling somewhere on the continuum between open
market transactions as the form of coordination at arm's length and hierar-
chy as the other extreme.
13
Severe criticism on this view has been brought forward by P
OWELL
stating
that alliances are a form of governance that is not intermediate between
markets and hierarchies.
14
He argues that strategic alliances are character-
ized through social governance mechanisms that are unique to these insti-
tutional forms and separate them clearly from market and hierarchy. Also
G
OSHAL
and M
ORAN
ar-
gue that social control
replaces contractual
mechanisms within stra-
tegic alliances character-
izing them as a third form
of coordination.
15
Major distinctions be-
tween these three forms
are the level of autonomy,
i.e. whether the members
of the organization are
12
In the organizational literature, researchers use the term network organization or
strategic network, which subsumes alliances as one possible form of network or-
ganization amongst other forms. As all characteristics of networks account also
for strategic alliances, in the following, the term strategic alliance is used instead
of network organization due to more relevance and accuracy for the research in
this thesis.
13
Cp. W
ILLIAMSON
(1975; 1985) on the choice of organizational governance
modes in accordance to the criterion of minimizing transaction costs. W
ILLIAM-
SON
finds just two governance modes in his early works on transaction cost the-
ory, namely market and hierarchy. This dichotomy is enhanced in his later works
by hybrid governance forms, for instance network forms of organization (cp.
W
ILLIAMSON
(1985), p. 79 and p. 83-84). He characterizes these forms as hybrid
because he finds that alliances provide characteristics of both governance forms.
14
Cp. P
OWELL
(1990), p. 298, p. 314-138, and p. 322.
15
Cp. G
OSHAL
/ M
ORAN
(1996).
16
Source: Adopted with modifications from W
ILLKE
(1995), p. 139.
Figure 2: Strategic alliances as a third form
of coordination
16
Hybrids
Level of autonomy
L
e
vel o
f
co
he
sio
n
high
low
low
high
Hierachy
Market
Strategic
Alliance
Hybrids
Hybrids
6
self-determined or other-determined and the level of cohesion, i.e. whether
the members strive for joint or individual goals.
17
In the figure above stra-
tegic alliances are illustrated as a third clear-cut form of coordination tak-
ing a medium position between hierarchies and networks that are "pieces
of a larger puzzle that is the economy."
18
Without further discussion at this point, strategic alliances are viewed in
the following as a third form of coordination due to their characteristics
and nature, which separates them from market and hierarchy. The next
section focuses on the nature of and characteristics inherent to alliances.
2.1 The nature of alliances
An inflationary use of the term strategic alliance can be observed involv-
ing several differing definitions.
19
Referring to the classification of alli-
ances as a third form of governance, some of the constitutional
characteristics of this form can be employed for the definition of this term.
Strategic alliances can be defined as cooperative inter-firm relationships
between two or more separate firms
20
that are characterized by a rela-
tively high degree of formality between the partners, while maintaining
their individuality and legal independence.
21
Within this relationship re-
sources, knowledge, and capabilities are shared and exchanged by com-
17
Whereas autonomy is maximal in market forms of organization and minimal in
hierarchies, it stands vice versa with cohesion. Alliances take a medium position
with both dimensions.
18
P
OWELL
(1990), p. 301.
19
Esp. the usage by American and European researchers reveals differing views on
strategic alliances. Whereas most European researchers view only horizontal co-
operations as strategic alliances (cp. A
LBERS
(2000), p. 12), American scholars
subsume horizontal as well as vertical and diagonal co-operations under this
term, thus, network forms or organizations (cp. e.g. G
ARRETTE
/ D
USSAUGE
(1995)). The American understanding is followed here, because of a more gen-
eral applicability.
20
Strategic alliances formed by multiple partner firms, i.e. forming a network
structure, are defined as alliance constellations in recent publications, as in G
O-
MES
-C
ASSERES
(1999) and similarly in D
AS
/ T
ENG
(2002). In the following,
only two partner firms are assumed in an alliance for purposes of simplicity, al-
though the generated insights apply also to multipartner alliances.
21
Cp. A
LBERS
(2000), p. 10; similarly G
OMES
-C
ASSERES
(1999): Strategic alli-
ances are "short of acquisition and deeper than arm's length contract".
7
plementing each other. These idiosyncratic contributions of resources by
the specific alliance partners enable the alliance to create "supernormal"
profits.
22
The essential characteristics of alliance nature are shown in the
following table.
Character-
istics
Market Hierarchy Strategic
Alliance
Normative
basis
contract;
property rights
employment con-
tract; power
complementarity;
exchange
Coordination
Through
prices directives
and
routines
negotiations
Operational
medium
money power knowledge
Relation of
Actors
independent unilateral
dependent
mutual
dependent
Mode of
interaction
indifference;
opportunism
indifference; but
also mistrust
trust
Methods of
conflict resolu-
tion
bargaining;
negotiating
directives;
control;
supervision
norms of mutual
exchange; reputa-
tion; culture
Asset
Specificity
low high intermediate
Transaction
Frequency
occasional occasional;
recurrent
recurrent
Table 1: Characteristics of different governance modes
23
The nature of an alliance agreement is close, long-term, and mutually
beneficial.
24
In order to ensure such an agreement, the governance struc-
ture is based on "incomplete" or open-ended contracts allowing a flexible
management of the alliance due to the impossibility to specify all potential
contingencies. G
OMES
-C
ASSERES
defines incomplete contracts as an
22
Cp. D
YER
/ S
INGH
(1998), p. 662.
23
Source: Adopted with modifications from P
OWELL
(1990), p. 300 and W
ILLKE
(1995), p. 137.
24
These characteristics correspond to the definition put forward by S
PEKMAN ET
AL
. (1995), p. 4. Consequently, state supported and financed R&D programs are
excluded as well as franchising, licensing, and short-term arrangements such as
one-time marketing or technology purchase agreements.
8
"agreement (written or unwritten) between at least two firms that leaves
open important terms of exchange, usually because of contingencies that
cannot be accurately foreseen at the time of the agreement."
25
The essence
of an alliance is shown in such relational or evolving contracts. In order to
develop social governance mechanisms as trust, norms, and mutual under-
standing strategic alliances are coequally organized and consist of long-
term relations and recurrent, structured transactions.
26
In that point alli-
ances can be distinguished clearly from spot-market transactions. On the
other side, strategic alliances do not necessarily have a common owner-
ship or explicit legal framework, what separates alliances from hierarchi-
cal firms giving them more autonomy.
27
Thus, alliances are clearly identi-
fiable as a third form of coordination.
J
ARILLO
points out that alliances
combine the advantages of both governance modes: hierarchy and market
by combining flexibility and efficiency, thus creating a win-win-
situation.
28
According to these differentiating characteristics, strategic alliances, as a
network form of organization, are a clearly identifiable and viable mode of
economic exchange with its own logic under certain specifiable circum-
stances.
2.2 Different forms
The academic literature suggests that the term strategic alliance encom-
passes a great variety of taxonomies in organizational forms. Some schol-
ars classify strategic alliances according to their legal form
29
distinguish-
ing between joint venture (JV), minority equity exchange, licensing, joint
R&D, supplier or distribution relationship. Other scholars categorize alli-
25
Cp. G
OMES
-C
ASSERES
(1999).
26
Cp. K
RYSTEK
/ Z
UR
(2002), p. 210.
27
In contrast to collusions, alliances are lawful forms of organizations although
they might not necessarily have a legal framework; cp. B
ARNEY
(1996), p. 255,
on the differentiation of collusive strategies and strategic alliances.
28
Cp. J
ARILLO
(1993), p. 144-145.
29
Cp. G
HEMAWAT
/ P
ORTER
/ R
AWLINSON
(1986); G
OMES
-C
ASSERES
(1999).
9
ances according to the direction of integration, i.e. the position of the alli-
ance in the value chain of the partners.
30
According to this criterion, verti-
cal, horizontal and diagonal alliances can be identified. The difference is,
that vertical alliances are formed between partners carrying out different
activities along the value chain, horizontal alliances between partners car-
rying out the same activity of
the value chain and diagonal
alliances apply to cooperating
partners in different industries.
Categorizations by functions,
e.g. sales and distribution,
manufacturing, or R&D, are
also very common.
31
A typol-
ogy in terms of conflict poten-
tial divides between procom-
petitive, noncompetitive, precompetitive and competitive alliances.
32
Moreover, different forms of alliances can be identified in terms of geo-
graphical range as regional, national or international.
33
Classifications by
equity participation differentiate between equity, minority equity, and
non-equity alliances.
34
A more eclectic approach to a classification of alli-
ances identifies opportunistic alliances, service consortia, and stakeholder
alliances.
35
While these concepts of classification remain unidimensional, i.e. focusing
on just one constitutional aspect of alliances, C
HILD AND
F
AULKNER
de-
veloped a three-dimensional taxonomy of alliance forms. It categorizes
alliances by scope, legal nature, and size of membership.
The alliance scope
37
is understood as the agreed upon breadth and depth
differentiating between focused alliances that are "set up to meet a clearly
30
Cp. B
RONDER
/ P
RITZL
(1992), p. 33.
31
Cp. P
UCIK
(1988).
32
Cp. Y
OSHINO
/ R
ANGAN
(1995), p. 19.
33
Cp. P
ORTER
/ F
ULLER
(1986); also C
ONTRACTOR
/ L
ORANGE
(1988), p. 72-73.
34
Cp. P
ISANO
(1989).
35
Cp. K
ANTER
(1994).
36
Cp. B
RONDER
/ P
RITZL
(1992), p. 33.
Figure 3: Forms of alliances by
direction of integration
36
customer
supplier
inside-
industry
competitor
outside-
industry
competitor
horizontal
dia
go
na
l
vert
ical
inside-
industry
competitor
outside-
industry
competitor
10
defined set of circumstances in a particular way"
38
and complex alliances
involving large parts of, or even the whole value chain.
39
The legal form
of the alliance is differentiated between the creation of legally separate
companies, e.g. JVs, and "mere" collaboration as the most flexible alliance
form in terms of boundaries, i.e. a high degree of permeability. The num-
ber of alliance partners can vary between at least two and several. Strate-
gic alliances can be classified by the characteristics of each dimension, as
depicted below.
Figure 4: Taxonomy of alliance forms
40
The last classification is the most comprehensive one, because of
considering various dimensions and criteria. It allows to subsume the
unidimensional classifications and to demonstrate the large variety of
slightly different forms of strategic alliances without neglecting their
commonalities. The large variety of different forms makes alliances
attractive for several different goals and motives that are examined in the
following section.
2.3 Goals and motives
Academics have not distinguished between goals and motives for the for-
mation of alliances on a common basis, but use these terms synony-
37
Cp. Spekman (1995), p. 8, for a definition of alliance scope.
38
Cp. C
HILD
/ F
AULKNER
(1998), p. 107.
39
The distinction in terms of function or position in the value chain (horizontal,
vertical and diagonal alliances) could be subsumed under this dimension.
40
Source: Adopted from C
HILD
/ F
AULKNER
(1998), p. 106.
Number of partners
Legal form
Scope
focused
complex
two
several
JV
collaboration
11
mously.
41
Yet, it is widely accepted, that the overall goal for the formation
of strategic alliances is the development of a mutual long-term strategy in
order to generate collective competitive advantage.
42
Following the classic
strategic management literature, competitive advantage can be achieved
by cost leadership or differentiation, which is based on synergies evolving
from collective processing activities or combined resources in case of co-
operation.
43
Synergies are characterized by less input of resources while
staying with the same output level. In order to realize synergies by coop-
eration, collective activities need to be compatible along both partners'
value chains. On this basis, two categories of motives can be distin-
guished, mostly aiming at cost-leadership and differentiation at the same
time.
44
The motives can be grouped with respect to internal orientation,
i.e. resource-based motives or external orientation, i.e. market-based mo-
tives. The following figure and explanations follow this classification.
Figure 5: Motives for strategic alliance formation
In general, there are four resource-based motives to be distinguished. Re-
source dependence is "a key internal motivation for alliance formation ...
to gain requisite skills or resources needed to respond to an external chal-
41
Cp. A
LBERS
(2000), p. 5, on the difference of goals and motives; also other ex-
pressions are used, for example by S
PEKMAN ET AL
. (1995) using the term "alli-
ance domain" for the reason and purpose of the alliance.
42
Cp. S
YDOW
(1992), p. 79; also A
LBERS
(2000), p. 6.
43
Cp. P
ORTER
(1986), p. 31.
44
Academics have identified several reasons for the formation of alliances and
have developed different systematologies in order to give an overview. L
O-
RANGE
/ R
OOS
(1992) differentiate between offensive and defensive reasons.
K
OGUT
(1988b) identifies three basic motives, which are transaction-costs, stra-
tegic behavior and organizational learning. C
ONTRACTOR
/ L
ORANGE
(1988), p.
9, list seven "more or less overlapping objectives" for the formation of strategic
alliances. Combining the typology of C
HILD
/ F
AULKNER
(1998) and C
ONTRAC-
TOR
/ L
ORANGE
(1988) leads to the systematology applied here.
Resource-based motives
Market-based motives
Motives for strategic alliance formation
·
Resource dependence
·
Learning
·
Risk limitation
·
Speed-to-market
·
Market power
·
Market entry
·
Cost minimization
12
lenge or opportunity of some sort."
45
Additional capacities, concentration
of core competencies and the access to physical resources are aspects of
this motive that refer to tangible resources. It could include all activities
and resources across the whole value chain, for instance joint financial
resources in order to posses higher liquidity for investments or also co-
branding in order to utilize reputation and radiation effects of brand
names.
46
Moreover, access to intangible resources, e.g. managerial rou-
tines or specific processes, could be in the focus of this motive.
47
The
learning motive strives for the access to and transfer of knowledge and the
combination of complementary resources. Although the focus tends to be
rather on the transfer of explicit than tacit knowledge, the partnering firms
may also learn and adapt intuitively the other partner's culture and behav-
ior.
48
Knowledge sharing enables the alliance to generate a competitive
advantage. The formation of a strategic alliance for learning reasons often
aims at technology development within the support activities, i.e. an R&D
JV, but could also focus on the smooth management of the whole supply
chain.
49
Risk limitation aims at removing the partners from the price va-
grancies of the market place and allows risk sharing among the partners.
Many alliances spread financial risks in highly intensive R&D investments
by joining costly scientific research facilities or pooling their financial and
R&D resources.
50
The speed-to-market motive describes the joint devel-
opment of processes, routines and products in order to be faster vis-à-vis
the competition and to realize a first-mover advantage.
51
Regarding the market-based motives, one could differentiate between
three distinct motives. The motive of joint market power could be directed
45
C
HILD
/ F
AULKNER
(1998), p. 74.
46
Cp. K
APFERER
(1997) on co-branding and marketing JVs.
47
Cp. D
AS
/ T
ENG
(2000b), p. 41-43.
48
Cp. K
OGUT
(1988a) finding that tacit knowledge (i.e. nonverbalizable, intuitive,
and unarticulated) can only be transferred by learning alongside the partner. In
contrast explicit knowledge is easier transmittable in formal, systematic lan-
guage and contains explicit facts, axiomatic propositions, and symbols.
49
Cp. H
AMEL
/ D
OZ
/ P
RAHALAD
(1989) and D
OZ
/ H
AMEL
(1997,1998) on learn-
ing as a central motive for entering strategic alliances.
50
Cp. S
TATA
(1989) on the motive of risk limitation in R&D alliances.
51
Cp. Y
OSHINO
/ R
ANGAN
(1995), p. 68, referring to the alliances of Xerox with
Novel, Lotus, Sun Microsystems, and Microsoft. These alliances enabled Xerox
to market innovative technology faster. Cp. also F
AULKNER
(1995).
13
at pushing through technological standards or enhancing attractiveness by
creating compatible interfaces in order to block competitors and prevent
them from market entry, i.e. securing a marketplace position. Technical
standardization might allow network economies and login effects, which
allow an even higher penetration of the market than the power resulting
from bundled market share. Moreover, the alliance could be meant for
improving the partners' image based on effects of reputation.
52
The motive
of market power may drive procurement activities as well. The bundled
purchasing power allows to source at lower costs. The focus might be on
primary activities, e.g. marketing and sales, as well as on support activi-
ties, e.g. procurement. Market entry can be among the motives to enter
into strategic alliances in order to gain a foothold in an emerging market
or access to politically blocked markets.
53
This motive does not only con-
sider the front-end of the value chain, i.e. the target market for additional
sales, but also the back-end, which aims at higher flexibility and security
for procurement activities and logistics allowing e.g. global sourcing. This
motive is of general interest for the firm, thus it considers the whole value
chain for partnering activities. The motive of cost minimization attempts to
realize economies of scale and scope in order to perform more efficient
vis-à-vis the competition in the market, thus it is market-driven.
54
Cost
minimization focuses on the primary value chain activities due to the col-
lective processing and production activities providing synergies, but in
principle could also be based on support activities such as joint procure-
ment or human resources management in order to reduce overhead costs.
Additionally to these two broad categories of motives for alliance forma-
tion, C
HILD
and F
AULKNER
offer also external catalysts, which can be sub-
sumed under the effects of globalization such as shortening product life
cycles, increasing instability of markets, and globalization of products and
markets.
55
52
Cp. D
OLLINGER
(1997) focusing on the reputation motive for JV formation.
53
Cp. C
HILD
/ F
AULKNER
(1998), p. 67-68.
54
Cp. W
ILLIAMSON
(1985) and K
OGUT
(1988b) on the efficiency criterion for the
formation of alliances according to transaction-cost theory.
55
Cp. C
HILD
/ F
AULKNER
(1998), p. 69-73; moreover cp. D
ELFMANN
(1998), p. 63,
for a specification of the term globalization.
Ende der Leseprobe aus 92 Seiten
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- Arbeit zitieren
- , 2003, Towards an Integrative Approach to Alliance Failure, Hamburg, Bedey Media GmbH, https://www.diplom.de/document/224434
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