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Böttcher, Jörg: The Ability of Young Children to Distinguish Between Morality and
Convention
Hamburg: Diplomica GmbH, 2002
Zugl.: Berlin, Universität, Diplomarbeit, 2001
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Contents
1. Question
5
2. Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development
6
2.1. The stage model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6
2.2. Structure, justice and morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
2.3. Investigation and scoring of moral judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11
2.4. Criticism of Kohlberg's theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
3. The role of emotions in early morality
13
3.1. Nancy Eisenberg's investigations of altruistic and prosocial behavior . . . . . . . . .
13
3.1.1.
The definition of altruistic and prosocial behavior
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13
3.1.2.
General methodology and results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
16
3.1.3.
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
24
3.2. Other approaches regarding the relationship of emotions to morality . . . . . . . . .
25
3.3. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
30
4. Elliot Turiel's concept of social domains
31
4.1. Definition of the social domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
32
4.2. Assessment methods and results of the domain research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
34
4.2.1.
Criterion judgments
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
34
4.2.2.
Justification categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
39
4.2.3.
Ratings and rankings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
42
4.3. The acquisition of social knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
44
4.4. Criterion judgments versus familiarity with events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
45
4.5. The relation between seriousness of transgression, criterion judgments, and justifica-
tion categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
47
4.6. Emotional consequences of transgressions in social domains . . . . . . . . . . . . .
49
4.7. A first comparison of Turiel's and Kohlberg's assessments and results . . . . . . . .
50
5. Domain specifities of social judgments and authority concepts
53
5.1. Domain specifities, mixed domains and moral dilemmas
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
53
3
5.1.1.
Mixed domain events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
53
5.1.2.
Moral conflicts and dilemmas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
57
5.1.3.
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
61
5.2. Authority concepts: Differences between legitimacy and obedience . . . . . . . . . .
64
5.3. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
71
6. Conclusions
72
6.1. Emotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
72
6.1.1.
Dilemma type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
72
6.1.2.
Emotional consequences to moral transgressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
74
6.2. Domains of social knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
74
6.2.1.
Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
75
6.2.2.
Justifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
76
6.2.3.
What one would do and what one should do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
77
6.2.4.
Legitimacy and obedience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
78
A. Stories
86
A.1. Killen (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
86
4
1. Question
In this diploma thesis I want to consider several approaches in the area of moral development research.
Given the theory of Lawrence Kohlberg, young children (younger than 10 years of age) seem to stay
completely under the constraints of authorities and rules. According to Kohlberg, children's social
judgments and behaviors are determined by instrumental aims to satisfy their own needs and wishes,
or to avoid punishment. In this regard, the helping of others or meeting the needs of others is only
motivated by instrumental considerations. Thus, in Kohlberg's view young children are not able to
think or to act in a genuinely moral way.
In reaction to Kohlberg, other researchers have suggested that young children are capable to make
genuinely moral judgments and to act in a moral way. Eisenberg (e.g. 1986) has suggested that young
under the age of 10 years children can have empathic or altruistic feelings which lead them to conduct
prosocial acts. Other researchers (e.g. Keller, 1996; Nunner-Winkler, 1993) assert that children under
the age of ten years are able to understand and feel moral emotions, which they consider as constitutive
or as indicators for morality. Turiel and his associates (e.g. Turiel, 1983) suggest that even children
at about 2 years of age (Smetana, 1981) are able to differentiate between a moral, conventional, and
personal domain of social knowledge, and that children subordinate the importance of personal and
conventional rules under the importance of moral rules. These approaches to the morality of young
children approaches to early morality revealed differing results to differing aspects of morality.
The aim of my work is to examine the above mentioned approaches in order to evaluate the obvious
differences between their obtained results and the results of Kohlberg.
My questions are: Is Kohlberg's approach of using authority dilemmas appropriate to investigate
children's moral reasoning? To what extent do the results of the researchers, who claim an early
emergence of morality in children's development, disprove Kohlberg's claims of children's depen-
dency and moral immaturity with regard to authority rules? Where are the boundaries of the presented
approaches?
I will begin with an introduction to Kohlberg's approach (chapter 2). Then, I will present the
research of Eisenberg, Keller and Nunner-Winkler, who investigated the role of emotions in moral
development (chapter 3). Chapter 4 and 5 deals with the domain approach of Turiel and the question,
how it could be possible to bridge the gap between their results and the results of Kohlberg. In the last
chapter (6) I will make several conclusions from my considerations about the research of children's
morality.
5
2. Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral
development
Lawrence Kohlberg (1927-1987) devised a theory of the development of moral judgment which he
called cognitive developmental theory (Kohlberg, 1976, 1969). He worked out and revised his theory
across a period of time of about 30 years (Heidbrink, 1991).
Kohlberg had started with the developmental theory of Piaget (1973, orig. 1932). From him he
adopted the assumption of human development as a universal growing and unfolding of the apprecia-
tion of justice principles:
More broadly, however, Piaget is correct in assuming a culturally universal age devel-
opment of a sense of justice, involving progressive concern for the needs and feelings of
others and elaborated conceptions of reciprocity and equality. (Kohlberg, 1968, p. 489)
Kohlberg designed a model of moral development, that goes beyond Piaget's approach. He integrated
assumptions of Piaget's moral and cognitive models of development, and combined them with Sel-
man's (1980) concept of perspective taking and Rawls' (1971) reflections about justice principles.
First, I will shortly describe Kohlberg's stage model of moral development. After that I will sketch
the theoretical assumptions which lead Kohlberg to his model.
2.1. The stage model
The stage model of morality sensu Piaget consists of two moralities:
[According to Piaget] there is not one morality, but two. There is the morality of
constraint and, later, as cognitive development proceeds, the morality of cooperation.
(Rest, 1983, p. 571)
Kohlberg's stage model of moral development is more differentiated than Piaget's. It consists of six
stages. These stages are divided into three main levels. That is, each main level contains two stages
(see table 2.1). Kohlberg named these three levels the preconventional, the conventional, and the
postconventional level.
Kohlberg describes the distribution of ages of the individuals on the different levels as follows:
6
Table 2.1.: Classification of Moral Judgment into Levels and Stages of Development
L
EVEL
B
ASIS OF
M
ORAL
J
UDGMENT
S
TAGES OF
D
EVELOPMENT
I
Moral value resides in external, quasi-physical
happenings, in bad acts, or in quasi-physical
needs rather than in persons and standards.
Stage 1: Obedience and punishment orientation.
Egocentric deference to superior power or prestige,
or a trouble-avoiding set. Objective responsibility.
Stage 2: Naively egoistic orientation. Right action
is that instrumentally satisfying the self's needs
and occasionally other's. Awareness of relativism
of value to each actor's needs and perspective.
Naive egalitarianism and orientation to exchange
and reciprocity.
II
Moral values resides in performing good or
right roles, in maintaining the conventional or-
der and the expectancies of others.
Stage 3: Good-boy orientation. Orientation to ap-
proval and to pleasing and helping others. Confor-
mity to stereotypical images of majority or natural
role behavior, and judgment by intentions.
Stage 4: Authority and social-order maintaining
orientation.
Orientation to "doing duty" and to
showing respect for authority and maintaining the
given social order for its own sake. Regard for
earned expectations of others.
III
Moral values resides in conformity by the self to
shared or shareable standards, rights or duties.
Stage 5: Contractual legalistic orientation.
Re-
cognition of an arbitrary element or startingpoint
in rules or expectations for the sake of agreement.
Duty defined in terms of contract, general avoid-
ance of violation of the will or rights of others, and
majority will and welfare.
Stage 6: Conscience or principle orientation. Ori-
entation not only to actually ordained social rules
but to principles of choice involving appeal to log-
ical universality and consistency. Orientation to
conscience as a directing agent and to mutual re-
spect and trust.
Source: Kohlberg & Kramer (1969)
7
The preconventional moral level is the level of most children under 9, some adolescent
and adult criminal offenders. The conventional level is the level of most adolescents and
adults in our society and in other societies. The postconventional level is reached only
after the age of 20. (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 33)
Kohlberg came to this age distribution by examining children from the age of 10 years. Since all
children at 10 years of age were categorized at the preconventional level, he supposes that all children
under 9 years are at the preconventional level, too.
The conventional level means conforming to and upholding the rules and expectations of society
or authority. People on this stage do this, because the rules simply are the conventions, the rules, and
expectations of society.
At the preconventional level individuals aren't able to recognize or understand the expectations of
society or conventional rules. An individual at this level concentrates on his needs and wishes. Al-
though the individual knows there are expectations of authorities, these expectations are only reflected
superficially, because the individual is only interested in reaching egocentric aims and wants to avoid
punishment by the authority or strives for a positive recognition.
An individual at the postconventional level accepts society rules. They were accepted, because
of the general moral principles behind this rules. When this moral principals come into conflict
with society rules, individuals at the postconventional level decide rather for their principles than for
conventional claims (Kohlberg, 1976).
Each stage will be passed by an individual in an invariant order, but not every individual reaches the
sixth stage.
1
The developmental stages are universal in the sense, that in many cultures these stages
could be discovered:
All individuals in all cultures use the same thirty basic moral categories, concepts, or
principles, and all individuals in all cultures go through the same order or sequence of
gross stage development, though they vary in rate and terminal point of development.
(Kohlberg, 1971, p. 175)
Kohlberg himself administered investigations with the aim to compare different cultures in this regard
(Kohlberg and Nisan, 1987, 1984; Kohlberg et al., 1987, 1984). Although Kohlberg considers moral
development as universal, he does not support the assumption of a quasi-biological development. For
him the social interaction with other individuals is important for stimulating the development:
It seems obvious that moral stages must primarily be the products of the child's interac-
tion with others, rather than the direct unfolding of biological or neurological structures.
However, the emphasis on social interaction does not mean that stages of moral judgment
1
There has been a long debate concerning the existence or non-existence of a sixth stage (e.g. Puka, 1996), because in
Kohlberg's own data this stage appears rarely. I will not follow this discussion here, because it is not relevant for the
problems I want to discuss in this work.
8
directly represent the teaching of values by parents or direct ,,introjection" of values by
the child. (Kohlberg, 1968, p. 491)
And elsewhere:
It is hardly plausible to view a whole succession of logics as an evolutionary and func-
tional program of innate wiring, particularly in light of the fact that the most mature
logical structures are reached only by some adults. (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 183)
Regarding the social interactional aspect, Kohlberg's theory of moral development is similar to Pi-
aget's (1958) theory of cognitive development. Piaget also considered development as an interplay
of accommodation and assimilation, which is related to a combination or interaction of internal and
external processes. Neither external factors (education, socialization) nor internal factors (biological,
genetic) alone can provide cognitive development.
2.2. Structure, justice and morality
Structures of moral judgments are, according to Kohlberg, cognitive structures. Cognitive develop-
ment is one of the absolute necessary requirements of moral development. The content of moral
thoughts is not as important as the formal structure of the judgments. Two individuals can be con-
vinced, for example, that stealing is wrong. But they may have come to this statement by reflections,
which could differ in their complexity (Döbert, 1996). Cognitive abilities are necessary for the child's
growing capability of perspective taking. In Kohlberg's stage model the concept of perspective taking
(Selman, 1980), plays an important role. Selman's model describes a growing ability for integrating
perspectives of other individuals in their reflections. He devised 5 levels of perspective taking. On
level 0 a child is not able to distinguish his or her own perspective from the perspective of another
person. At level 1 the child is able to do this. At level 2 the child begins to see the itself with the eyes
of another person. At level 3 the child is able to see his relation to another person from the perspective
of a third person. Finally, at level 4 the child can see relations in a wider network of many relations.
For illustration, see figure 2.1. In this figure ,,S" means ,,Subject", and ,,O" means ,,Others".
In the description of Kohlberg's stages the growing ability to include the perspectives of others is
obviously incorporated (Heidbrink, 1991). On Kohlberg's stage 2 the needs of others were recog-
nized. This level corresponds to level 1 of Selman. On Kohlberg's stage 4 the social organizational
perspective can be considered. This is similar to Selman's level 4.
The different levels of perspective taking depend on the cognitive developmental abilities of the
child (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969). Cognitive development is a precondition of perspective taking,
and perspective taking is a precondition for moral development. The development of logical thinking
in the sense of Piaget (1958) develops from the intuitive over the concrete-operational to formal-
operational thinking. This development proceeds parallel to moral thinking (Kohlberg, 1973). Thus,
9
S
O
3rd p.
Level 3
S
O
S
O
S
O
Level 0
Level 1
Level 2
Level 4
O
S
Society
Figure 2.1.: Levels of social perspective taking by Selman et al., 1982 (from Heidbrink, 1991)
the structure of moral judgments consists of logical structures and structures of perspective taking.
These preconditions are necessary, but not sufficient. As Kohlberg states:
Intelligence may be taken as a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of moral advance.
All morally advanced children are bright, but not all bright children are morally advanced.
(Kohlberg, 1968, p. 491)
To make moral judgments moral, there have to be added structures of justice (Kohlberg & Kramer
1969). That is, judgments have to be subordinated under principles of justice. Although Kohlberg
admits, there are other moral principles, he supposes justice as a principle, which includes all other
moral principles, like utilitaristic goals, orientation on an ideal self or even empathy with others. All
these principles can be reduced to the principle of justice:
While all orientations may be used by an individual, we claim that the most essential
structure of morality is a justice structure. (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 40)
Justice is the fundamental principle of morality. For Kohlberg it's impossible acting morally and
injustice at the same time (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969).
The individual passes the six stages one after another. The final point and ,,aim" of this development
is stage 6. At this point an individual applies justice principles to societal and authority expectations.
These expectation have to fulfill the norms of justice, otherwise they were rejected by an individual
at this stage. Stage 6 is therefore the fulfillment of morality. All other stages below this stage are
insufficient with regard to justice. On stage 6 justice principles are completely unfolded (Kohlberg
& Kramer, 1969). To say it in Puka's words: ,,No single stage can be defined without a preceding
definition of stage 6." (Puka, 1996, p. 241).
By the application of justice principles the individual is more and more prepared for providing social
equilibrium (Kohlberg, 1973). Rest (1983) describes this aspect of Kohlberg's justice conception as
follows:
10
[T]he central problem of morality is to determine the legitimate claims of people in a
situation and to prioritize and balance those claims according to principles that impartial,
rational people could accept as governing principles for cooperative interaction. (Rest,
1983, p. 571)
Kohlberg names the resulting developmental structure of moral judgment, which integrates perspec-
tive taking and justice principles, the sociomoral perspective, ,,which refers to the point of view the
individual takes in defining both social facts and sociomoral values, or oughts." (Kohlberg 1976, p. 33)
2.3. Investigation and scoring of moral judgments
Kohlberg began with an investigation of 10 to 20 year old boys/adults from Chicago (N = 72), who
had to resolve 10 moral dilemmas (Kohlberg, 1958). In these dilemmas conflicting moral claims were
pitted against each other and the subjects had to decide, which action the protagonist should choose.
In the famous Heinz dilemma, for example, a man has to steal a medicine from a pharmacist for saving
the life of his wife. Kohlberg was not interested in the decisions themselves, the content of the judg-
ment, but in their reasoning about the dilemmas, that is the structure of moral judgment. He assumed,
that reasoning in the course of unstandardized interviews reflects the deeper structure of the indi-
viduals cognitive structures and the available justice principles (Kohlberg, 1973). Until today, these
standard dilemmas have been used within Kohlbergian research. In the following 30 years of investi-
gation, Kohlberg applied his dilemmas to adolescent and adult subjects in varying countries. (Snarey
(1985) presents a comprehensive meta review of all conducted studies using Kohlberg's dilemmas.)
The expressions of subjects during their reasoning about the dilemmas are scored with a very exten-
sive and differentiated scoring system. The last revision of the scoring system resulted in a 800-page
scoring manual (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987). In the course of investigation by Kohlberg and his col-
leagues the scoring guide has been changed several times for achieving a better differentiation of
structure and content of moral judgments. The changes have not been trivial. Rest (1983) reports an
only small correlation of .39 between subjects' scores using the scoring systems from 1958 and from
the 1978 system.
The structure of moral judgments develops with the growing cognitive capacities of the child. One
can ask, in which sense exactly is a higher stage better than a lower stage, that is, which dimensions
were actually scored with Kohlberg's manual. Rest (1983) summarizes the progressive structures of
moral judgment in the sense of Kohlberg:
1. Each stage in the sequence is progressively more differentiated and integrated.
2. With development, each new stage employs cognitive operations that are more reversible and
equilibrated.
3. With development, each new stage has a more encompassing perspective on society.
11
With these assumptions Kohlberg refers to the stage concept of Piaget (1960). The scoring system of
Kohlberg aims to capture these structural transformations. Because every stage is a structured whole,
a given stage response represents the whole stage. It ,,represents an underlying thought-organization."
(Kohlberg, 1973, p. 181) Moreover, because individuals try to solve problems in this case moral
dilemmas on their highest available cognitive level, the obtained answers in the interviews are likely
to represent the individuals highest stage in his moral reasoning.
According to the last scoring manual (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987), it is required that 25% of a person's
reasoning has to be at a certain stage to be included in the subject's global stage score. So, the global
stage score is the finally obtained measure of a person's morality in the scoring system of Kohlberg.
I will not further describe Kohlberg's scoring system. For the purpose of comparing Kohlberg's
theory and results with alternative approaches it is sufficient to have a rough idea, how the extent or
maturity of moral development within Kohlberg's theory is conceptualized and measured.
2.4. Criticism of Kohlberg's theory
Actually, one of the main purposes of this thesis is to criticize Kohlberg's claims with regard to the
morality of young children by presenting alternative approaches to morality. For this reason, I will
not describe the whole criticism to Kohlberg's theory at this place.
I only want to mention one of the main objections against Kohlberg's statements about young
children's morality, the fact that he had never investigated children, who were younger than 10 years
of age (Snarey, 1985). If one accepts Kohlberg's definition of morality in terms of a growing ability
of social perspective taking and the integration of justice principles, this objection is not a strong
one, because one could question: Why should one investigate at which moral stage children younger
than 10 years of age should be classified, if children at 10 years of age and older are located at the
lowest stage? However, approaches of other researchers, like the investigations of Elliot Turiel and
associates, or approaches to the emotional aspects of morality, like Nancy Eisenberg's research and
research of Monika Keller (e.g. 1996), showed, that young children can understand or act morally.
And even researchers, who applied Kohlberg's system to children under 10 years of age, sometimes
revealed moral thinking at the conventional level. In Snarey's (1985) review the studies of Lei (1980,
1981), Lei and Cheng (1984), and Saadatmand (1970), revealed such results.
The following sections of this work can be seen as a further examination of investigations, which
present alternative approaches to Kohlberg's theory of moral development.
12
3. The role of emotions in early morality
3.1. Nancy Eisenberg's investigations of altruistic and prosocial
behavior
Nancy Eisenberg had begun a research program in the middle 70s, which comprises several longi-
tudinal and cross-sectional investigations of the development of children's and adults' prosocial or
altruistic judgments and behavior. The initial question of Eisenberg and her colleagues was, whether
Kohlberg's approach to moral development was able to capture children's reasoning about prosocial
dilemmas. Eisenberg et al. considered Kohlberg's dilemmas as entailing only prohibitional aspects.
Following from this, it would not be surprising that children use authority/punishment justifications
for their decisions (Eisenberg, 1986; Eisenberg-Berg, 1979). Eisenberg proposes to investigate chil-
dren's judgments and behavior in prosocial dilemmas.
According to Eisenberg, Kohlberg's justice principles capture only the cognitive aspects of moral
reasoning and miss emotional aspects, which are necessary to act in an empathic way (Eisenberg,
1986; Hoffman, 1982). One of the central emotional aspects in Eisenberg's research is prosocial
behavior and it's sources in altruistic and empathic emotions as motivational factors.
3.1.1. The definition of altruistic and prosocial behavior
First, it is important to understand the differences between prosocial and altruistic reasoning and
behavior. According to Eisenberg, these differences have to be located in the motivational sources of
the related behavior. These motivations can be emotional and/or cognitive in nature. Eisenberg defines
altruistic behavior as motivated by at least one of the following factors (Eisenberg, 1986, p. 210):
· Sympathy
· Self-evaluative emotions (or anticipation of these emotions) associated with specific internal-
ized moral values and norms or one's responsibility to act in accordance with these values or
norms.
· Cognitions concerning values, norms, responsibilities, and duties unaccompanied by discernible
self-evaluative emotions
13
· Cognitions and accompanying affect (e.g., feeling of discomfort due to inconsistencies in one's
self-image) related to self-evaluation compared with one's self-image
Prosocial behavior has a positive effect to other individuals, independent of the motivation for this
behavior. That is, helping someone in need could be motivated by fear of punishment, by striving
for acknowledgment, by instrumentalistic reasons (like direct reciprocity), by the wish to make new
friends, or by the feeling of sympathy with someone in need.
The main focus of Eisenberg's research lies in the latter aspect, sympathy, which she considers as
relevant for prosocial/altruistic emotions and behavior (Eisenberg, 2000, 1986). According to her, it
is important to differentiate three different forms of emotions that have been labeled as ,,empathy"
within research literature, although in her view only a certain type of emotional reaction should be
called empathy or better: sympathy.
In order to avoid a confound and to increase the clarity of the different aspects of ,,empathy", she
differentiates the following forms:
1. If the individual feels the same emotion as the other, and is not able to differentiate between
the own feeling and the feeling of the other, Eisenberg speaks of ,,emotional contagion" (1986,
p. 31), which occurs most frequently among very young children. This responding is purely
empathic.
2. Another form of empathy is sympathy. This term is used, if an individual feels an emotion,
which ,,is not identical, but is congruent with the other's emotional state and his or her welfare."
(1986, p. 31) Sympathy stems ,,from the apprehension or comprehension of another's emotional
state or condition, which is not the same as what the other persons is feeling (or is expected to
feel) but consists of feelings of sorrow or concern for the other." (2000, p. 672) Eisenberg
assumes that especially this feeling is likely to motivate altruistic behavior.
3. A third type of emotion should not be called empathy, because it is a self-concerned feeling and
not an other-concerned one. A person, who feels anxiety in view of the sadness of another, is not
empathic or sympathetic but feels personal distress. Personal distress is a self-focused, aversive,
affective reaction to the apprehensions of another's emotional state (Eisenberg, 2000). Personal
distress and sympathy in Eisenberg's definition comprise more cognitive elements than pure
empathy. Sympathy is most likely to initiate altruistic behavior. Personal distress only leads
to prosocial behavior if this is the easiest way to reduce one's own aversive state (Eisenberg,
2000).
Making these differentiations, Eisenberg (e.g. 2000) supposes that feeling personal distress, when
confronted with someone in need, leads only to prosocial behavior if it is not possible to ,,escape"
from this situation by another action. In contrast, feeling sympathy/empathy leads even to prosocial
behavior, if it would be possible for the helper, to escape from this situation.
14
Eisenberg and colleagues investigated these assumptions by examining interdependencies between
children's naturally occurring empathic emotions, experimentally induced empathic emotions, and
prosocial behavior. Particularly, they were interested in differences between distress and sympathy.
In a study by Eisenberg et al. (1990a), for example, a multidimensional approach was used (ta-
ble 3.5 on page 23). Empathic emotions were experimentally induced by showing subjects films
entailing interviews with children, who experienced accidents. Subjects' heart rate data and facial
expressions were measured. Afterwards, subjects had the opportunity to ,,help" the children, who
were presented in the film, by putting crayons in a box. Subjects expected to be unobserved, because
the experimenter left the room for several minutes. The number of crayons served as a measure for
the willingness to help. Also, subjects' behavior was naturally observed over several weeks in their
school. The researchers were particularly interested in subjects' compliant and assertive behavior in
situations, in which other children requested them to give or to share their toys with them.
Eisenberg et al. (1990a) considered dispositional compliant individuals as typically experiencing
high levels of personal distress in terms of a personal trait. These individuals seek to avoid conflicts,
and therefore they are relatively compliant and nonassertive when they are confronted with others' dis-
tress. Dispositional assertive children are conceptualized as being relatively undaunted and assertive
in the face of another's distress.
The results showed that personal distress, which was measured by subjects' facial expressions dur-
ing the film, was negatively correlated to helping (putting crayons in a box), positively correlated to
dispositional compliant behavior in the school, and negatively related to dispositional assertive behav-
ior. In contrast, sympathy was positively correlated to helping, negatively correlated to dispositional
compliant behavior, and positively correlated to dispositional assertive behavior.
This study shows that it is important to differentiate between the different aspects of ,,empathy",
especially between personal distress and sympathy as motivational sources of prosocial behavior. Ac-
cording to the study of Eisenberg et al. (1990a), dispositional compliant behavior, which is motivated
by personal distress, can not be considered as moral behavior. Children, who typically experience per-
sonal distress, are only motivated to help in situations, where helping is the best way in order to cope
with their aversive feelings. In the part of the study, where such children supposed to be unobserved,
they did not help. In contrast, sympathetically motivated children even helped in situations, where
escaping would be easy. In the study, they helped although seemingly nobody would recognize it.
According to Eisenberg (1986), there are also other emotional factors, which can motivate prosocial
behavior, are self-evaluative processes which could lead to emotions such as pride or guilt. These
emotions require norms and values, which the individual wants to follow. Helping in this sense can be
motivated by guilt feelings, if a norm is not fulfilled. Or by feelings of pride, when one has fulfilled the
norms. These self-evaluative feelings have a large cognitive contribution, because the individual has
to recognize the situation as relevant to his/her own norms and values. Different social perspectives
have to be evaluated, one has to discern oneself as potentially responsible or capable for a certain
outcome, etc. Although Eisenberg also considers these cognitive factors as important predictors for
15
prosocial behavior (Eisenberg, 1986), her central aim was the investigation of sympathetic emotions
as motivational factors for moral reasoning and behavior.
3.1.2. General methodology and results
Eisenberg wanted to examine, if young children are only motivated by avoiding punishment and/or
meeting their own needs in their moral reasoning, or if children are capable to act because of genuine
moral/altruistic considerations. She devised moral dilemmas, which entailed no prohibitions, rules,
or threats of punishment (Eisenberg et al., 1995, 1987, 1983; Eisenberg-Berg and Roth, 1980). In the
birthday dilemma, for example, personal needs were pitted against prosocial behavior (see box on the
next page). As mentioned, Eisenberg criticized Kohlberg for his focus on justice in his conceptualiza-
tion of morality. As Eisenberg stated, Kohlberg assumed that his moral stages could be applied to all
kinds of moral judgments, although he used only a few dilemmas.
. . . most of [Kohlberg's] research has dealt with only one domain of moral judgment,
that of prohibition-oriented reasoning. In nearly all of Kohlberg's dilemmas, laws, rules,
authorities, and formal obligations are salient concerns and frequently dominate the indi-
vidual's reasoning about the conflicts. (Eisenberg-Berg, 1979, p. 128)
She wanted to apply dilemmas, which entailed prosocial motives. Prosocial conflicts in the view of
Eisenberg are
. . . moral dilemmas in which the desires or needs of the story protagonist are in conflict
with the needs of another in a context in which explicit rules, authorities, laws, punish-
ments, and formal obligations are irrelevant or deemphasized. (Eisenberg-Berg, 1979)
Although, according to Eisenberg, prosocial motives could also be found in research with Kohlberg
dilemmas (Heinz dilemma), altruistic emotions are in comparison to other motives not very rel-
evant to solve these dilemmas. She considers Kohlberg's Heinz-dilemma as having a ,,life-or-death
nature" (Eisenberg, 1986, p. 123). Justification categories, ,,such as affiliated relationships, the value
of life, moral law, and conscience" are more relevant in order to solve these dilemmas, than altruistic
reasons.
Some of Eisenberg's dilemmas (like the birthday dilemma, for example) are also more familiar to
children than Kohlberg's dilemmas.
I do not agree with this view of Eisenberg. Not all Kohlberg dilemmas have a life-or-death nature.
1
But, Eisenberg is right in stating that Kohlbergian dilemmas entail authoritarian and prohibitional
elements. In Kohlberg's dilemmas, the relationships are institutionalized, whereas non-hierarchical
relationships, like friendships do not occur (Keller, 1996).
1
The Joe/Judy-dilemma, for example, entails conflicts between the norm of promise keeping, authority, property, and not
lying.
16
Usually, the subjects in Eisenberg's studies have to decide, what they should do in these dilemmas,
and to justify their decisions (see table 3.2 on page 19 and table 3.5). Answers were categorized into
content categories and finally, the categories were computed into a stage system.
2
Eisenberg's prosocial dilemmas
Birthday story (Eisenberg, 1986)
One day a girl named Mary was going to a friend's birthday party. On her way she saw a girl
who had fallen down and hurt her leg. The girl asked Mary to go to her house and get her
parents so the parents could come and take her to the doctor. But if Mary did run and get the
child's parents, she would be late for the birthday party and miss the ice cream, cake, and all
the games. What should Mary do? Why?
Poor farming village (Eisenberg-Berg, 1979)
A poor farming village named Circleville had a harvest that was just enough to feed the
villagers with no extra food left over. Just at that time a nearby town named Larksdale was
flooded and all this town's food was ruined, so that they had nothing to eat. People in the
flooded town of Larksdale asked the poor farmers of Circleville to give them some food. If
the farmers did give the food to the people of Larksdale, they would go hungry after working
so hard all summer for their crops. It would take too long to bring in food from other villages
further away because the roads were bad and they had no airplanes. What should the poor
farming village do? Why? What kind of things do you feel are important in making this
decision?
Based on her assumptions about emotional influences concerning moral judgments her stage system
aims to comprise both cognitive aspects of perspective taking and emotional factors. It is somewhat
similar to the stage system of Kohlberg (see table 3.3). Stage 1 comprises children, whose reasoning
depends on hedonistic or self-focused categories.
Also, Eisenberg's stage 5 is comparable with Kohlberg's stage 5. Individuals at Eisenberg's stage
5 are considered as having ,,societal contractual obligations", and they are believing ,,in the dignity,
rights, and equality of all individuals" (table 3.3). Kohlberg considers individuals at stage 5 as having
a ,,contractual legalistic orientation". They try to avoid the ,,violation of the will or rights of others"
(table 2.1 on page 7).
2
Eisenberg only mentioned that she and her colleagues ,,have delineated an age-related sequence of development of proso-
cial moral judgment." (1986, p. 143) Within my literature research, I found no further explanation of the exact way
of constructing this sequence. One step towards this construction seemingly was the computing of a factor analysis of
subjects' justification categories (Eisenberg, 1986; Eisenberg-Berg, 1979).
17
Table 3.1.: Prosocial moral-reasoning categories
1. Obsessive and/or magical view of authority and/or punishments.
Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right. The physical consequences of
action determine its goodness regardless of human values and needs.
2. Hedonistic reasoning.
(a) Pragmatic, hedonistic gain to the self: Orientation to gain for oneself (besides gain resulting from direct reciprocity).
(b) Direct reciprocity: Orientation to personal gain due to direct reciprocity (or lack of it) from the recipient of an act.
(c) Affectional relationship: Individual's identification with another, their liking for the other, and the other's relation to one's
own needs are important considerations in the individuals's moral reasoning.
3. Nonhedonistic pragmatism.
Orientation to practical concerns that are not directly related to either selfish considerations or the other's need. Example: ,,I'd
help because I'm strong."
4. Concern for other's needs (needs-oriented reasoning).
(a) Concern for other's physical and material needs: Orientation to the physical and material needs of the other person.
Examples: ,,He needs blood."
(b) Concern for other's psychological needs: Orientation to the psychological needs and affective stated of the other person.
Example: ,,They'd be happy if they had food."
5. Reference to and concern with humanness.
Orientation to the fact that the other is human, living, a person.
6. Stereotyped reasoning.
(a) Stereotypes of a good or bad person: Orientation to stereotyped images of a good or bad person.
(b) Stereotyped images of majority behavior: Orientation to ,,natural" behavior and what most people would do.
(c) Stereotyped images of others and their roles: Orientation to stereotyped images of others and what others do. Example:
,,I'd help because farmers are nice people."
7. Approval and interpersonal orientation.
Orientation to others' approval and acceptance in deciding what is the correct behavior.
8. Overt empathic orientations.
(a) Sympathetic orientation: Expression of sympathetic concern and caring for others. Examples: ,,He would feel sorry for
them." or ,,She'd be concerned."
(b) Role taking: The individual takes the perspective of the other and explicitly uses this perspective in personal reasoning.
Examples: ,,I'm trying to put myself in her shoes." or ,,She'd know how it feels."
9. Internalized affect.
(a) Simple internalized positive affect and positive affect related to consequences: The individual simply states that he or she
would ,,feel good" as a result of a particular course of action without giving a reason, or says that the consequences of his
or her act for the other person would inspire good feelings. The affect must be used in a context that appears internalized.
Example: ,,She'd help because seeing the villagers fed would make her feel good."
(b) Internalzed positive affect from self-respect and living up to one's values: Orientation to feeling good as the result of living
up to internalized values.
(c) Internalized negative affect over consequences of behavior: Concern with feeling bad or guilty due to the consequences of
an act.
(d) Internalized negative affect due to loss of self-respect and/or not living up to one's values: Orientation to feeling bad as
the result of not living up to internalized values.
10. Other abstract and/or internalized types of reasoning.
(a) Internalized law, norm, and value orientation: Orientation to an internalized responsibility, duty, or need to uphold the
laws and accepted norms or values.
(b) Concerns with the rights of others: Orientation to protecting individual rights and preventing injustices that violate an-
other's rights.
(c) Generalized reciprocity: Orientation to indirect reciprocity in a society (i.e., exchange that is not one-to-one but eventually
benefits all). Example: ,,If everyone helps one another, we'd all better off."
(d) Concern with the condition of society: Orientation to improving the society or community as a whole.
Source: Eisenberg-Berg (1979)
18
Table 3.2.: Summary of Eisenberg's studies concerning prosocial reasoning (longitudinal and cross-
sectional studies)
S
T
U
D
Y
S
U
B
J
E
C
T
S
C
O
N
T
E
N
T
/Q
U
E
S
T
IO
N
S
E
FF
E
C
T
S
/R
E
S
U
L
T
S
Eisenber
g-Ber
g
(1979)
Cross-sectional
study
2nd,
4th,
6th,
9th,
11th,
and
12th
graders,
(N
=125)
F
our
prosocial
dilemmas
(see
box
on
page
17).
What
should
the
protagonist
do?
Wh
y?
(Justification
cate
gories
in
table
3.1.)
No
se
x
ef
fects.
Se
v
eral
reasoning
cate
gories
v
aried
by
age:
Stereotype
of
good/bad
person
and
appro
v
al
and
interpersonal
reasoning
decreased
with
age.
Nearly
all
empathic
and
internalized
cate
gories
in-
creased
with
age.
Stereotype
of
majority
reasoning
increased
with
age.
(All
significant
cate
gories
listed
in
table
3.4.)
Eisenber
g
et
al.
(1995,
1987,
1983,
1980)
Longitudinal
study
T
w
o
cohorts:
C1
(4-12
years
of
age,
N
=32);
C2
(4-10
years
of
age,
N
=34)
a)
F
our
prosocial
moral
dilemmas
a)
Hedonistic
reasoning
decreased
with
age.
Increasing
of
needs-oriented,
stereotypic,
an
d
appro
v
al
oriented
reasoning.
From
the
age
of
7-8
years
up
increasing
of
higher
le
v
el
reason-
ing,
lik
e
role-taking,
sympathetic,
and
positi
v
e
af
fects
related
to
consequences.
These
three
age
ef
fects
occurred
only
for
girls.
In
addition,
girls
used
more
role-taking
reasoning.
b)
T
w
o
K
ohlber
g
dilemmas:
H
ei
n
z
and
Judy
dilemma.
Dilemmas
w
ere
scored
both
with
K
ohlber
g'
s
and
with
Eisenber
g'
s
system.
b)
K
ohlber
g'
s
MMSs
did
not
correlate
significantly
with
Eisen-
ber
g'
s
composite
score.
But
if
K
ohlber
g'
s
dilemmas
were
com-
puted
with
Eisenber
g'
s
composite
score,
a
significant
correla-
tion
of
r
=
.49
between
prosocial
and
prohibitional
moral
judg-
ment
w
as
obtained.
c)
Measuring
of
prosocial
beha
vior:
Children
could
donate
a
part
of
their
earnings
anon
ymously
.
Or
the
y
could
help
an
adult
picking
up
dropped
pa-
perclips.
c)
Donating
w
as
ne
g
ati
v
ely
related
to
hedonistic
and
positi
v
ely
related
to
needs-oriented
reasoning.
The
lo
w-cost
helping
sit-
uations
were
unrelated
to
moral
reasoning
scores.
d)
Measuring
of
empath
y
with
a
scale
of
Bryant
(1982)
d)
Empath
y
w
as
ne
g
ati
v
ely
related
to
hedonistic
reasoning
and
positi
v
ely
related
to
needs-oriented
reasoning
and
prosocial
be-
ha
vior
(under
c).
Eisenber
g
et
al.
(1990b)
Cross-cultural,
longitudinal
study:
Children
were
inter
-
vie
wed
at
grade
3
and
6.
3rd
and
6th
graders,
24
kib-
b
utz
children,
28
children
of
Israel
city
F
our
h
y
pothetical
prosocial
dilemmas
(lik
e
in
Eisenber
g'
s
longitudinal
stud
-
ies,
table
3.2).
Justifications
for
their
decisions.
(Cat-
egories
described
in
table
3.1.)
Israel
city
children
used
more
hedonistic
and
pragmatic
rea-
sons
than
kibb
utz
children,
and
fe
wer
reasons
reflecting
con-
cern
for
direct
reciprocity
and
humanness.
Direct
reciprocity
,
internalized
la
w
,
generalized
reciprocity
and
social
contract
reasoning
increased
with
age.
Direct
reciprocity
increased
more
for
kibb
utz
children.
Pragmatic
reasons
increased
only
for
city
children.
19
Table 3.3.: Eisenberg's stages of moral judgment
L
EVEL
O
RIENTATION
D
ESCRIPTION
G
ROUP
1
Hedonistic, self-focused
The individual is concerned with self-
oriented consequences rather than moral
considerations. Reasons for assisting or
not assisting another include considera-
tion of direct gain to self, future reci-
procity, and concern for others who the
individual needs and/or likes (due to the
affectional tie).
Preschoolers and younger ele-
mentary school children
2
Needs of others
The individual expresses concern for
the physical, material, and psychological
needs of others even though the other's
needs conflict with one's own needs. This
concern is expressed in the simplest terms,
without clear evidence of self-reflective
role taking, verbal expressions of sympa-
thy, or reference to internalized affect such
as guilt.
Preschoolers
and
elementary
school children
3
Approval and interper-
sonal or stereotyped
Stereotyped images of good and bad per-
sons and behaviors and/or considerations
of others' approval and acceptance are
used in justifying prosocial or nonhelping
behaviors.
Elementary and high school stu-
dents
4a
Empathic
The individual's judgments include ev-
idence of sympathetic responding, self-
reflective role taking, concern with the
other's humanness, and/or guilt or positive
affect related to the consequences of one's
actions.
Older elementary school and
high school students
4b
Transitional
(empathic
and internalized)
Justifications for helping or not helping in-
volve internalized values, norms, duties,
or responsibilities, or refer to the neces-
sity of protecting the rights and dignity of
other persons; these ideas, however, are
not clearly stated.
Minority of people at highschool
age
5
Strongly internalized
Justifications for helping or not helping
are based on internalized values, norms,
or responsibilities, the desire to maintain
individual and societal contractual obliga-
tions, and the belief in the dignity, rights,
and equality of all individuals. Positive or
negative affect related to the maintenance
of self-respect for living up to one's own
values and accepted norms also character-
izes this stage.
Only a small minority of high
school students and virtually no
elementary school children
Source: Eisenberg et al. (1983)
20
Ende der Leseprobe aus 88 Seiten
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Details
- Arbeit zitieren
- , 2001, The Ability of Young Children to Distinguish Between Morality and Convention, Hamburg, Bedey Media GmbH, https://www.diplom.de/document/221666
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