Motivation and Punishment of Referees in non-professional Football
- Art: MA-Thesis / Master
- Autor: Michael Negri
- Abgabedatum: Mai 2010
- Umfang: 134 Seiten
- Dateigröße: 7,1 MB
- Note: 1,3
- Institution / Hochschule: Universität Bielefeld Deutschland
- Bibliografie: ca. 75
- ISBN (eBook): 978-3-8428-0108-0
- Sprache: Englisch
- Prämierung:
- Arbeit zitieren: Negri, Michael Mai 2010: Motivation and Punishment of Referees in non-professional Football, Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag
- Schlagworte: Motivation, Prinzipal-Agenten Theorie, Sport, Management, Fußball
48,00 €
PDF-eBook Download: 48,00 €
MA-Thesis / Master von Michael Negri
Introduction:
‘Contradicting the referee is like standing up in the church to ask for a discussion.’ This admittedly exaggerated appreciation of a football referee nonetheless shows that a neutral institution in football matches seems to be essential. Especially in professional football, referees play an important role as they are the ‘judges’ in a game that has developed into an entertainment industry in the past years. However, not only the professional football needs referees. In comparison to the 10,000 professional football players, about 6,500,000 amateurs actively play this sport. This, in return, means that there are far more referees in non-professional football.
The focus of this work is to examine how effective punishments and motivational means can be in order to improve the interaction between the players in a Principal-Agent constellation. The analyzed case deals with referees in non-professional football (Agents) and their interaction with the supervising managing-committee (Principal) in the district of Guetersloh, Germany. As the committee is responsible for the referee training, development and assignment, the persons in charge do have a basic interest in motivated referees. However, the reason for the unsatisfactory situation seems to result from exactly those mentioned motivational issues. The insufficient participation in the monthly meetings, the absence during the yearly examination and the lack of willingness to take over matches are only a few of the current problems, the managing-committee is confronted with.
The question which shall be answered in the course of this work will be: How can the problems in the work of the referee managing-committee be solved with particular regard to the PAT (‘Principal-Agent Theory’), motivation and punishment?
In order to answer this question with a special focus on the effectiveness of motivation, the Principal-Agent Theory will be applied as theoretical basis and shall be backed up by elements of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs and Vroom’s Expectancy Theory. The role of punishment shall be analyzed with the help of the Deterrence Hypothesis. As this case is also relevant for the work of managing-committees in other districts and countries, practical recommendations for improvement will be developed without neglecting the given constraints in this issue.
This work is split up into eight sections. Following the introduction, section two will introduce the basic issues of this work, directly leading to the explanation of the author’s motivation for the given topic and the relevance for other parties involved. Furthermore, the scientific approach of this analysis will be explained. The third section will introduce the key terms in the context of this work whereas the following section will set the theoretical framework. Section five focuses on the presentation of the case. This includes the explanation of the referees` organizational framework, but also the display of the prevalent problems in the case. Moreover, the case solution (Section 6) aims at applying the theories and the empirical survey to the problems in order to find practical solution mechanisms. Section seven critically evaluates the applied theories and the empirical survey that was conducted in regard to their contribution to the case solution. Finally, the work ends with a conclusion and an outlook.
The main findings in regard to motivational issues and the role of punishment were derived from the empirical survey. Additionally, the application of the Principal-Agent Theory delivers further solutions. As the activity is a hobby, the referees in non-professional football do not feel that they have to be committed extraordinarily, but rather expect appreciation of their dedication. This attitude is the basic trigger of the problems described. In order to solve those, a positive enforcement of the referees’ behavior seems to be more promising than to punish misbehavior. Especially appealing to the morale and the introduction of a formal ‘contract’ represent promising approaches. However, in the long run, the number of referees has to be significantly increased in order to let the referees’ performance and behavior become decisive factors again. This can be reached by increasing the PR (‘Public Relations’) efforts and by improving the recruitment process.
Table of Contents:
| 1. | Introduction | 1 |
| 2. | Problem and Methodology | 3 |
| 2.1 | Problem Definition and Relevance | 3 |
| 2.2 | Research Methods | 5 |
| 3. | Key Terms: Punishment and Motivation | 6 |
| 3.1 | Punishment | 6 |
| 3.2 | Motivation | 6 |
| 4. | Theoretical Background | 7 |
| 4.1 | The Principal-Agent Theory | 8 |
| 4.2 | The Deterrence Hypothesis | 13 |
| 4.3 | Motivation and Punishment in Scientific Literature | 17 |
| 5. | Referees in non-professional football – The District of Guetersloh | 21 |
| 5.1 | Facts and Figures | 21 |
| 5.2 | Organization | 25 |
| 5.2.1 | Structures | 25 |
| 5.2.2 | The Referee Constitution | 26 |
| 5.2.3 | Recruitment Process | 26 |
| 5.2.4 | Monthly Meetings and Annual Test | 28 |
| 5.2.5 | Referee Assignment Process | 29 |
| 5.2.6 | Remuneration | 30 |
| 5.2.7 | Promotion/Relegation | 32 |
| 5.3 | Display of the Problems | 34 |
| 5.4 | Hypotheses | 35 |
| 5.4.1 | Motivational Issues | 35 |
| 5.4.2 | Punishment/Fines | 35 |
| 5.5 | The Questionnaire Study | 36 |
| 5.6 | Results from the Questionnaire Study | 38 |
| 5.6.1 | Motivation | 38 |
| 5.6.2 | Monthly Meeting | 39 |
| 5.6.3 | Annual Test | 40 |
| 5.6.4 | Punishment and Fines | 41 |
| 5.6.5 | Coaching | 42 |
| 5.6.6 | Bribery / Game Manipulation | 42 |
| 6. | Case Solution | 43 |
| 6.1 | Missing Quantity of Referees | 43 |
| 6.2 | Missing Quality of Referee Aspirants | 45 |
| 6.3 | Unreliability of active Referees | 49 |
| 6.4 | Bribery and Game Manipulation | 57 |
| 6.5 | Motivation | 58 |
| 6.5.1 | Application of the Needs Hierarchy | 59 |
| 6.5.2 | Application of the Expectancy Theory | 61 |
| 6.6 | The Effectiveness of Punishment | 64 |
| 6.6.1 | Application of the Deterrence Hypothesis | 64 |
| 6.6.1.1 | Value of the illegal Booty | 65 |
| 6.6.1.2 | The Probability of being convicted | 67 |
| 6.6.1.3 | Monetary Equivalent of the Punishment | 68 |
| 6.6.1.4 | The Costs of Law Enforcement | 69 |
| 6.6.1.5 | Other Forms of Punishment | 70 |
| 6.6.2 | Empirical Evidence | 72 |
| 7. | Critical Valuation | 73 |
| 7.1 | Assessment of the applied Theories | 73 |
| 7.1.1 | The Principal-Agent Theory | 73 |
| 7.1.2 | The Needs Hierarchy | 75 |
| 7.1.3 | The Expectancy Theory | 75 |
| 7.1.4 | The Deterrence Hypothesis | 77 |
| 7.2 | Assessment of the Empirical Study | 79 |
| 8. | Conclusion and Outlook | 80 |
| Bibliography | 82 | |
| Appendix | 87 | |
| List of Abbreviations | 131 | |
| List of Figures | 132 |
Text Sample:
Chapter 6.4, Bribery and Game Manipulation:
The last problem area resulting from Principal-Agent relationship is the agent`s ‘Hidden Intention’. Even if the KSA could monitor every match in the district, the referees` intention would remain latent. The KSA puts itself in dependence on the referees by qualifying and assigning them to matches. This is, because the motive of maintaining the competition by assigning an official referee to each match can only be reached with a sufficient quantity and quality of referees.
What this exactly means becomes obvious when considering the problems regarding game manipulation and bribery. Not only is the current manipulation affair in the professional football in Europe object to ‘Hidden Intention’ of players and referees, but also in non-professional football. In the past, more and more irregularities in the matches were discovered. Especially in the lower divisions that face little presence in the newspapers, games are manipulated. Clubs that find themselves in the relegation or promotion battle offer their opponents incentives in form of money or beer for a deliberate loss at the end of a season. This trend surely may not be stopped by the interference of referees. However, what concerns the KSA most is that the referees play an increasingly important role in this constellation. The questionnaire study revealed that 18% of 30 referees have been offered money by club representatives for conscious decisions to the benefit of the respective team. The maximum amount offered is 300 Euros.
The actual number of referees who have been approached in this regard might even be higher even though the questionnaire was filled out anonymously. As the referees cannot be perfectly monitored, other ways to limit the potential of game manipulation must be found. The analysis of the referees` motives shows that their reasons for choosing this activity often refer to personality issues. The referees obviously like to take over responsibility (average score 4.2) and feel happy and relieved after matches (average score 4.1). Additionally, there is no significant score for the statement: 'I am a referee to earn money' (average score 2.6). Concluding from these empirical results, it can be said that the referees basically do not seem to be open to bribery and manipulation. However, this tendency still is prevailing. Effective counter measures therefore have to appeal to issues that are of importance for the referee. Thus it seems to be promising to set up a ‘Code of Conduct’ for the referees. The intention of this document shall be to appeal to the referees` morale and sportsmanship. The contract therefore shall contain promises referring to the honor and morale of referees and their responsibility for a fair competition. The referees shall additionally sign this contract to create a binding, ‘legal’ character. This contract is to be understood as a tool to foster the common culture among the referees.
Concluding, it can be said that the problem of bribery can only hardly be solved due to the given constraints. A formal and binding document might help to appeal to the referees` morale and thus to decrease their openness to game manipulation. Nonetheless, this issue is not only of interest for the KSA, but also for the entire football. After having analyzed the various problems explicitly, motivational aspects and the role of punishment will now be addressed as separate topics.
Motivation:
So far, the prevalent problems were elaborated on with the help of the Principal-Agent Theory. The focus will now be set on the contribution of the motivational theories that were introduced. As the activity represents an honorary office, it seems to be promising to learn more about the referees` motivation.
This view is also supported by Farrell/Johnston/Twynam who figured out that sport organizations must understand their employees` motivation to let them perform efficiently. In order to do so, Maslow`s Needs Hierarchy will be regarded in a first step. Victor Vroom`s Expectancy Theory will then be used subsequently to find further approaches for the case solution.
Application of the Needs Hierarchy:
Maslow systematically illustrates the hierarchy of human needs that range from basic needs such as shelter and salary to ‘Self-Actualization Needs’ such as a challenging job. Applying this theoretical approach to the referees might help to learn more about their basic motivation to take over this position. In doing so, the Needs Hierarchy shall be regarded with a bottom-up approach. According to Maslow, the most basic needs are of physiological nature. These comprise money and shelter, for example. In the presented case, this level of needs is not the decisive factor to become a referee. As German citizens, the arbitrators are part of the welfare state and neither suffer from extreme poverty nor from homelessness. Although it may be remarked that they receive a monetary reward for their activity, this remuneration does not represent a significant factor to ensure financial stability, but rather a small income source. The second level refers to the safety of oneself, the family and other important objects. Again, the referee activity cannot be reasoned by this needs level as it does not provide any form of safety. In contrast, being a referee is directly linked with conflicts during the matches and thus does not satisfy ‘Safety Needs’. ‘Love Needs’ as the third layer of needs cannot be the decisive factor for a person to become a referee for the same reason. As already pointed out, the referee function rather leads to the task of facing conflicts with players and officials of the teams. The next step in the Needs Hierarchy is referred to as ‘Esteem Needs’. When fulfilling ‘Esteem Needs’, an individual wants to be unique with self-respect and to gain the esteem from other individuals. Exactly this seems to be the most common reason to become a referee. By taking over this task, the individuals are responsible for the adequate adherence to the rules.
This is directly linked with reaching a certain status in the local sports scene. Especially for the young referees, promotion can be an important reason to become a referee and thus to achieve personal aims. All these aspects have an immediate impact on the person`s esteem as a consequence. According to Maslow, the most abstract need is to self-actualize oneself. This can be reached by experiencing and realizing all inner potentials. Considering the referee activity, it is questionable if this activity suffices to satisfy the needs of self-actualization. It may be argued that this ‘hobby’ cannot help to self-actualize oneself. However, being a referee at the same time means to cope with criticism, stress and other challenging situations. The empirical analysis shows that many referees see an opportunity for personal growth in this honorary task.
Concluding, it can be said that the motives for being a referee typically are not to be found in the basic needs. With reference to Maslow, ‘Physiological’, ‘Safety’ and ‘Love Needs’ are no crucial factors in the decision process to become a referee. ‘Esteem Needs’ in a first place, but also ‘Self-Actualization Needs’ represent the determinants to be a referee to a much greater degree. This is, because the aforementioned needs are fulfilled to a satisfactory extent. Surely, the individual aspiration might differ among the referees. However, what they have in common is that the basic needs are fulfilled due to the given circumstances in Germany and the social system that the citizens are in. Consequently, the people strive to fulfill further, more abstract needs. This apparently can be reached with the referee activity.
48,00 €
PDF-eBook Download: 48,00 €
Link zur Arbeit:
http://www.diplom.de/ean/9783842801080
Arbeit zitieren:
Negri, Michael Mai 2010: Motivation and Punishment of Referees in non-professional Football, Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag
Schlagworte:
Motivation, Prinzipal-Agenten Theorie, Sport, Management, Fußball



