Currency Board Arrangements. Rationale for Their Introduction, Advantages and Disadvantages
The Case of Bulgaria
- Art: Diplomarbeit
- Autor: Svetoslav Pintev
- Abgabedatum: September 2002
- Umfang: 74 Seiten
- Dateigröße: 818,9 KB
- Note: 1,5
- Institution / Hochschule: Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales (IUHEI) Schweiz
- ISBN (eBook): 978-3-8324-6549-0
-
ISBN (Paperback) :
978-3-8324-6549-0 P - ISBN (CD) :978-3-8324-6549-0 CD
- Sprache: Englisch
- Prämierung:
- Arbeit zitieren: Pintev, Svetoslav September 2002: Currency Board Arrangements. Rationale for Their Introduction, Advantages and Disadvantages, Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag
- Schlagworte: exchange rate regime, currency board, transition countries, Bulgaria, Währungsaufschluß
In den Warenkorb
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Diplomarbeit von Svetoslav Pintev
Abstract:
Currency board arrangements, under which domestic currency can be issued only to the extent that it is fully covered by the central bank’s holdings of foreign exchange, were long generally dismissed as throwbacks to the colonial era. It was argued that such a rigid, rule-based arrangement was not well suited to diversified economies in many of which the authorities had developed sophisticated skills in monetary management. Instead, currency boards were seen as desirable in very small open economies (such as city-states for example). In 1960, 38 countries or territories were operating under a currency board. By 1970, they were 20 and, by the late 1980s, only 9.
In the last decade the interest for Currency Board Arrangement (hereinafter CBA) renewed because of its simplicity, transparency, and rule-bound character. It became evident after the successful efforts made by two transition economies-Estonia and Lithuania-which quickly managed to achieve credibility for their newly established currencies. In 1997, a currency board arrangement was introduced in Bulgaria to end the economic crisis. Soon after, Bosnia and Herzegovina followed. In 1998 there have been discussions on establishing a currency board arrangement in Russia. More recently the newly appointed Finance Minister of Poland initiated a debate on pegging the Polish zloty to the euro through a CBA.
This paper previews the history of the colonial and modern currency boards and presents the benefits of such a system for the newly emerged transition economies in Eastern Europe and Bulgaria especially. First, we will present a brief description of the currency board system.
Currency Board Arrangements after falling into oblivion during much of the post-war period, staged a remarkable comeback mainly in Central and Eastern Europe countries. Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina have introduced this particular monetary framework and as a result have managed to break inflationary inertia, to bolster the credibility of the monetary authorities and to instill macroeconomic discipline.
Table of Contents:
| I. | Introduction | |
| 1. | What is a currency board? | |
| 2. | What a currency board is not? | |
| II. | Origins of the Currency Board | |
| 1. | Intellectual origin of the currency board system | |
| 2. | Early Currency Board Systems | |
| 3. | Decline of the Currency Board system. Reasons | |
| 4. | Currency board system in nowadays | |
| III. | Currency Board system and Countries in transition | |
| 1. | Factors determining the choice of monetary regime in Central and Eastern Europe | |
| 2. | Recent currency boars-like systems in the countries in transition. Estonia, Lithuania, Bosnia and Herzegovina | |
| 3. | Advantages and Disadvantages from a „country in transition“ view, theoretical discussion | |
| 4. | Performance. Empirical evidence | |
| IV. | The case of Bulgaria | |
| 1. | Reasons for introduction of the currency-board system in Bulgaria. The collapse of the financial system | |
| 2. | Structure and Practical Implementation | |
| 3. | Analysis of the Macroeconomic framework before and after the establishment of a CBA in Bulgaria. The role of the CBA in Bulgaria`s after-crisis stabilization | |
| 4. | The benefits of the Currency Board system in Bulgaria. A critical regard five years after | |
| V. | Conclusion | |
| VI. | Bibliography |
some in a successful way, other to a less extent30. That is why, the choice of a rulebased, institutionally implemented rather than a discretionary form of monetary policy was preferable as it was easier to apply and offered transparency in the decision-taking process. The third great advantage of a currency board is that it builds in a payment adjustment mechanism. This is none other than what has often been identified as the gold-standard adjustment mechanism. Thus a country is not exposed to any temptation of engaging in support of balance of payment operations that can be very expensive and devastating31. The final advantage of the CBA is that because of the preceding three featuresassured convertibility, discipline over fiscal policy and inflation, and certainty of a payments adjustment mechanism-a currency board has good perspectives of maintaining the confidence of the public in general and the financial markets in particular. It should be relatively immune to speculative crises induced by fears of devaluations. B. Disadvantages Some of the criticisms of CBA have already been mentioned in Chapter.II.3. Here we adopt the approach of a “country in transition” while reviewing the disadvantages of the CBA. The seigniorage problem refers to the absence of domestic credit by the central bank that implies the inability of the monetary institution to control the monetary creation. The experience shows that in most of the cases the transition economies’ governments used to abuse with this source of revenue. So, tying one’s hands with [...]
The Central Bank of the newly independent Bosnia and Herzegovina began operations in 1997 according to the Dayton peace agreement. It acts as a CBA issuing a local currency- convertible marka (KM), which is pegged to the euro at rate of 1KM=0.511292 Euros. The aim of the currency board was to have the newly born local currency displace the four currencies that used to circulate in BH during the civil war and, in the meantime, to become a symbol of national unity. A specific feature of this CBA is that for the first six years of its operation the governor is appointed, after consultation with the government, by the IMF, and must not be a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina or a neighboring state. It is an orthodox CBA, i.e. no “lender of last resort” clause stipulated in the law establishing the BHCB: ”The central bank may not extend credit by creating money”. Credibility: as during the civil war, the Deutsche mark was the only currency people trusted in, the choice of the anchor currency made and the transparency of the [...]
All in all, Estonia’s currency board arrangement has played an important role in the country’s macroeconomic stabilization in general and in lowering the inflation in particular. It has contributed to Estonia’s economic growth (10.4% in 1997!) by increasing both the public’s and the foreign investors’ confidence in the soundness of the policymaking, with a strict monetary and a sound fiscal policy being pursued (See Appendix, Table 1). Performance: The automatic mechanism of the Estonian CBA was tested several times, the most serious test being the Asian and Russian crisis of 1997-1998. The fast response of the interest rates is an indirect proof of the smooth functioning of the CBA. (See Appendix 1, Fig. 1) [...]
In den Warenkorb
68,00 €
Link zur Arbeit:
http://www.diplom.de/ean/9783832465490
Arbeit zitieren:
Pintev, Svetoslav September 2002: Currency Board Arrangements. Rationale for Their Introduction, Advantages and Disadvantages, Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag
Schlagworte:
exchange rate regime, currency board, transition countries, Bulgaria, Währungsaufschluß



