British foreign and defense policy
How does the relationship with the United States and the Commonwealth affect its point of view towards an ever increasing importance of the EU?
- Art: Magisterarbeit
- Autor: Marc Nikolas Liehr
- Abgabedatum: September 2003
- Umfang: 102 Seiten
- Dateigröße: 694,2 KB
- Note: 1,0
- Institution / Hochschule: Georg-August-Universität Göttingen Deutschland
- ISBN (eBook): 978-3-8324-7755-4
-
ISBN (Paperback) :
978-3-8324-7755-4 P - ISBN (CD) :978-3-8324-7755-4 CD
- Sprache: Englisch
- Prämierung:
- Arbeit zitieren: Liehr, Marc Nikolas September 2003: British foreign and defense policy, Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag
- Schlagworte: Europe, Europa, Cooperation, EDC, Great Britain
In den Warenkorb
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Magisterarbeit von Marc Nikolas Liehr
Abstract:
Is Great Britain really a desperate European? This was the question in mind whilst writing this essay. Would Britain go to war against Iraq with the United States of America, or would it search for a peaceful solution together with ‘old’ Europe within the United Nations. The answer to this question is well known today. The UK decided to wage war on Iraq together with America. Once again Britain gave its continental European partners the feeling to be more the fifty-first state of America than a member of the European Union, trying to find a common European position in foreign and security policy.
Why does the UK behave the way it does? Is it really taking a reluctant position against an ever increasing importance of the EU in foreign and security affairs? What is it about its relationship to the US, and which role does the Commonwealth play in this area traditionally the domain of sovereign national politics? The essay examining these questions will come to an ‘astonishing’ conclusion.
At the moment Britain is celebrating its 30th anniversary of EU membership. This should be an occasion to find out more about its foreign and defence policy.
At the time of writing, Britain was the only European power coupled with the US in preparing for a war against Iraq. The question has to be asked as to why Britain has adopted such a pro-American stance? Since Blair's election to power in 1997, time and time again he has emphasized that Britain's future is in Europe. However, certainly with regard to foreign and defence policy, such a statement appears hollow. What happened with those honourable aims of European integration like a Common Foreign and Security Policy, which was established as a 'pillar' of the EU by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Finding an agreed European Common and Foreign Policy certainly has not been obtained and could even be said to be in its worst state ever. Nothing illustrated this better than the diversity of opinion within the EU concerning the possible war with Iraq. Italy and Spain tended towards the position of the US and Britain. France wanted to formulate a new UN resolution before deciding the course of action they wish to take. Germany stood against the use of any force.
At present, it would seem that the CFSP remains an objective to be realised at a later date. Past and present, none of the other EU members act as closely with the US as Britain. Is Britain's policy influenced by American interests rather than finding a common ground within Europe?
The following chapter will discuss the connection between these two countries. As a starting point to understanding this unusual phenomenon, we shall examine it from an historical perspective. Understanding a nations intention presupposes to know its history out of which its sentiments arise. Therefore it shall be concentrated in the following on important Anglo-American historical events. Why, for example, had the UK such a strong interest in the Middle or Far East instead of concentrating on Europe? Which effect did the 'humiliating' experience of the Suez crisis have on British thinking?
The historic development of the Anglo-American partnership has been closely linked with that of the nuclear policy and as such shall be the second point of the following discussion. Since existence of nuclear weapons it was a vital matter for the UK having an independent nuclear deterrent. De facto the British independent nuclear deterrent is dependent on partnership with the US. They provide Britain with missiles systems, though not with nuclear warheads. The UK is the only individual country to which the US supplies them. How did this special atomic relationship arise? It shall be surveyed if there really is an atomic partnership and what intentions did the UK have entering into such a dependence.
Furthermore, the influence of this connection on a possible European nuclear force shall be discussed. Therefore this part of the work concentrates on the Nassau Meeting of 1962, and the following discussion to establish a Multilateral Nuclear Force/ Atlantic Nuclear Force. Cooperation or coordination of the European deterrent was never that close to its realisation.
The second chapter will discuss the relation between Great Britain and its Commonwealth. Regarding former British greatness in its foreign and defense policy is automatically linked to its Empire/ Commonwealth. But what happened to this linkage which Margaret Thatcher described as ' the deceptive might of an Empire which continued to expand until 1919 but which cost more to defend than it contributed to national wealth? Today little remained of the Empire. It is nearby to presume, that this transition could not develop without having any impact on British policy towards Europe.
Lastly, the third chapter examines the interrelations between the United Kingdom's relationship with the United States, the Commonwealth and Britain's security policy in the post-war European order. The twentieth century has been a highly militarised one for the UK. After two world wars in fifty years, the British developed a cautious approach to dissolving their defence capability in Europe Moreover, Britain faced a new threat in the form of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the cold war. How did this effect British foreign and defence policy towards Europe? A key theme of this part will be the establishment of a western European defense system, the search for an European defence identity, and the British opinion towards the latter.
Table of Contents:
| Abbreviations | iv | |
| Introduction | 1 | |
| Chapter 1. | Britain’s ‘Special Relationship’ with the United States | 1 |
| Introduction | 3 | |
| The historical development of Anglo-American relationship | 4 | |
| The relationship is getting ‘special’ | 4 | |
| Differences over the Middle East | 6 | |
| The Korean War | 7 | |
| The Suez Crisis | 9 | |
| East of Suez | 12 | |
| First signs of getting ‘European’ | 13 | |
| The 1980s – Moving towards the Falklands War | 14 | |
| A new World order | 16 | |
| Conclusion | 17 | |
| A nuclear cooperation? | 18 | |
| Introduction | 18 | |
| The independent nuclear deterrent | 19 | |
| The Sandys White Paper | 20 | |
| The Bermuda Meeting and its consequences | 21 | |
| The Nassau Meeting | 23 | |
| The Multilateral Nuclear Force | 25 | |
| The Atlantic Nuclear Force | 27 | |
| The Strategic Defense Initiative | 28 | |
| Conclusion | 30 | |
| Chapter 2. | Great Britain and the Commonwealth | 32 |
| Introduction | 32 | |
| Britain, Western Europe and the Commonwealth as the ‘third power’ | 33 | |
| The maintenance of the worldwide commitments | 35 | |
| The ‘Wind of Change’ | 37 | |
| Conclusion | 39 | |
| Chapter 3. | Great Britain and Europe | 41 |
| Introduction | 41 | |
| A restrained approach towards Europe | 42 | |
| The foundation of NATO | 45 | |
| A rearmament of Germany? | 46 | |
| Finding a solution | 49 | |
| The European Defence Community | 50 | |
| Britain and the demise of the EDC | 52 | |
| The ‘birth’ of the Western European Union | 57 | |
| A defence organisation; a British mouthpiece to Europe? | 60 | |
| The existence of a non-existing British-European/common European foreign and defence policy | 61 | |
| The search for an increased European defence identity | 64 | |
| On the way to Maastricht | 67 | |
| The Treaty of Maastricht | 70 | |
| The Yugoslavia Crisis | 71 | |
| Time for a change? | 73 | |
| The Treaty of Amsterdam | 75 | |
| Recent days… | 77 | |
| Conclusion | 81 | |
| Conclusion | 83 | |
| Bibliography | 86 |
The first step in establishing a European defence framework, was the signing of the Dunkirk Treaty, between Britain and France, in March 1947. The Treaty focused primarily on Germany and was designed to prevent its re-emergence as a military power. It did not have a crucial military importance,183 but it was a ‘confidence building move’ by the UK towards France, signalling British readiness to the long term security of France from a remilitarised Germany.184 With the Dunkirk Treaty in place, it became possible to consider the inclusion of other west European countries into a security framework. Yet, the talks with Belgium did not progress far when the American Secretary of State, George Marshall, presented a programme to recover European economies with American support.185 However, as Hogan stated, there was not only an agreement to the aims of the Marshall Plan.186 Although the Europeans were dogged to protect their own interests, not least Britain with its Commonwealth trade and financial preferences, the programme forced Western European states to work together.187 [...]
members, ensuring its own security and projecting itself as a powerful and influential actor on the international stage.’182 Not wanting to harm her relations with the US and the Commonwealth, the UK preferred intergovernmental as opposed to integrated cooperation. Regarding herself as a great power, Britain’s interests in its foreign and defence policy concentrated more on Commonwealth issues and seeking a partnership with the US rather than defining a European defence policy. Many continental Europeans looked to the UK for leadership to create a ‘new Europe’, but first, when the evident lack of cohesion amongst the Europeans threatened to leave the continent without a credible defence structure, it was the UK who was prepared to intervene in the situation. [...]
urged Bevin to seek American backing. The idea of establishing a Western European bloc as a third force was replaced by the British desire to strengthen her links with the US and the Commonwealth. The abandonment of the ‘third force’ idea, did not, however, rule out other forms of economic cooperation. If Britain was going to regain economic independence from the US, the Empire’s resources and European cooperation were still important. The rejection of a European customs union added a further blow to the chances of a Western union being established under British auspices. The Commonwealth had initially been seen as a form of economic salvation that would result in independence from the US. However, by 1949, dependence on the US was essential if the Commonwealth were to be saved. Although the British were concerned about becoming a ‘junior’ partner in the Anglo-American relationship, American support for Britain was deemed important. The ‘government might have to be prepared to subordinate British interests to the general interests of the West in order to carry their allies with them.’173 For British policy-makers, it was a fundamental rule that, ‘the core of our foreign policy is and must remain the Atlantic alliance. Whatever happens, we must not find ourselves in the position of having to make a final choice between the two sides of the Atlantic’.174 By seeking American support, Britain was confronted with the issue of decolonisation. With the US anti-colonial attitude in mind, Macmillan tried to keep on side by pursing a course of decolonisation.175 At the same time, he attempted to maintain Britain’s great power status by strengthening the Commonwealth. He defined the Commonwealth’s aim as to move from an Empire to a ‘family.’ In hindsight, it is clear, that he placed to much faith in the Commonwealth’s potential. His expected decolonisation to result in increasing Britain’s international standing. Yet this ‘proved a forlorn hope.’176 As Heinlein comments, ‘The idea of transforming an Empire into a family might have been unrealistic, but it testifies to an astonishing maturity with regard to the kinds of force and exercise of power still considered permissible’.177 The aim of Britain at this time was ‘to persist in the ruinous make-believe that the United Kingdom was a first-class world power, and at the same time pursue the [...]
In den Warenkorb
74,00 €
Link zur Arbeit:
http://www.diplom.de/ean/9783832477554
Arbeit zitieren:
Liehr, Marc Nikolas September 2003: British foreign and defense policy, Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag
Schlagworte:
Europe, Europa, Cooperation, EDC, Great Britain
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